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Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) affect corporate
cash holding policies. We construct an index (CFO index) that enables us to distinguish
between “strong” and “weak” CFOs based on their ability to influence firm outcomes. We
find that firms with strong CFOs hold substantially less cash than firms with weak CFOs,
ceteris paribus. Importantly, the CFO effect documented in our study goes beyond the effect
caused by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) on cash holdings. Our findings provide the
first direct empirical evidence that firms with strong CFOs are well positioned to hold less
cash due to their relatively weak precautionary motive and superior ability to raise external
financing during periods of financial stress. Consistent with an agency explanation, our re-
sults also show that strong CFOs fulfil a monitoring role in firms with higher agency costs.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the role of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) has evolved considerably and has
expanded beyond the traditional controllership and compliance functions. Despite competing
priorities, liquidity management is commonly placed at the top of the CFO agenda. A global
survey of CFOs from 29 countries reveals that three of the four most highly ranked functions
that create firm value are activities related to corporate liquidity management (see Lins
et al., 2010).1
Cash holdings provide an important means through which firms ensure liquidity (Almeida
et al., 2014), especially during periods of financial stress and limited access to credit (Campello
et al., 2011). The extant literature focuses almost exclusively on the role of CEOs and how
they affect corporate cash and other financial policies.2 For example, Bertrand and Schoar
(2003) look at CEOs’ managerial styles; Liu and Mauer (2011) focus on CEO compensation
incentives; Custódio and Metzger (2014) study CEOs’ financial industry expertise; Bernile
et al. (2017) analyze CEOs’ early-life disaster experience; Deshmukh et al. (2017) focus on
CEO optimism; and Ferris et al. (2017) examine CEO social capital.
This study extends prior research by focusing on CFOs, who have received much less
attention in the literature, and sheds light on the question of how they matter to corporate
financial policies. In particular, we firstly analyze the effect of CFOs on cash holding policies.
In order to reconcile some of our findings on cash holdings, we also examine the extent to
which CFOs facilitate access to external finance, especially during crisis periods, as well as
the CFO effect on other corporate financial and investment policies.
A key feature of our study is the construction of an index (rendered, CFO index), which
attempts to capture the ability of the CFO to influence key financial policies. To construct
1Several recent surveys involving global CFOs highlight the prominent role of liquidity management, especially in
the nearly 10 years since the financial crisis. For example, according to the 2014 Michael Page’s “CFO and Financial
Leadership Barometer”, 48.2% of a sample of 2,847 global financial leaders specify cash and liquidity management as
a top company priority. The findings of several other surveys lead to similar conclusions. See e.g., “Strategic Priorities
for UK businesses”, Chartered Institute of Management Accountants and Robert Half Management Resources, 2010;
“The Value of the Modern CFO: Board Directors’ Perspective”, Singapore CFO Institute and the ACCA, 2012;
“Building the CFO Function: Roles and Responsibilities”, Singapore CFO Institute and Singapore Management
University, 2012.
2In the spirit of Opler et al. (1999), we refer “corporate cash policy” to the amount of assets held by a corporation
in a liquid form; that is, cash and marketable securities. Precautionary-based (see e.g., Bates et al., 2009), transaction-
based (see e.g., Opler et al., 1999) and agency-based motives (see e.g., Jensen, 1986) determine the way firms design
their cash policy and the amount of cash and marketable securities held.
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our measure, we draw on the literature concerning the association between managerial char-
acteristics and firm outcomes, and in particular, on studies that aim to conceptualize and
measure the power and influence of boards and their directors (see e.g., Hambrick, 1989;
D’Aveni, 1990; Finkelstein, 1992; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Golden and Zajac, 2001;
Castanias and Helfat, 2001; Adner and Helfat, 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Güner et al.,
2008; Masulis and Mobbs, 2011; Bedard et al., 2014). Our index is constructed by combining
six CFO-specific attributes which, as analytically discussed in Section 2.2, directly relate to
the capacity of the CFO to exert influence over corporate decisions. These are: (1) board
membership; (2) outside board directorship; (3) seniority (as proxied by age and/or tenure);
(4) level of financial expertise; (5) pay status (if the CFO is among the top three paid ex-
ecutives); and (6) relative pay status (compared to the CEO). Based on the CFO index, we
distinguish firms into those with strong (or more influential) CFOs and those with weak (or
less influential) CFOs.3
We empirically investigate the effect of CFOs on corporate cash decisions using a large
sample of UK firms over the period 1998 to 2011. The UK provides a unique setting for
our empirical investigation. The first motivation behind examining a UK sample is the well-
documented surge in the cash holdings of UK firms during that period and the resulting
concerns of investors and policy-makers about possible adverse consequences for investment
returns and economic growth.4 Furthermore, CFOs in the UK, also commonly referred to as
finance directors, are perceived to play a more important strategic role as illustrated by the
fact that they sit on the board of directors in the vast majority of firms (above 85% in our
sample). This particularly high percentage is in contrast to the US experience, where only
3In Section 2.2, we consider additional CFO attributes but they do not add significantly to the information
contained in the benchmark version of the CFO index.
4For instance, a recent article in the Financial Times entitled “UK Companies Sit on Giant Piles of Cash” states
that “The net cash position of FTSE 100 companies has risen from £12.2 billion in 2008 to £73.9 billion in 2013.
These large cash piles, which are earning low returns, has increased shareholder concerns, who want companies to raise
dividends, boost investment or pursue mergers and acquisitions to increase returns.” (Published on: September 29,
2013). Another recent article in the Financial Times entitled “Carney’s Salutary Change of Mind” states that “were
(UK) companies to continue hoarding cash rather than investing, economic growth may well disappoint” (Published
on: February 12, 2014).
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about 11% of CFOs hold board positions.5,6 The presence of CFOs in non-executive advisory
boards outside their own firm is also remarkable in the case of the UK market (more than
25% in our sample).
Our study reports several important findings. Our main analysis demonstrates a signif-
icant negative association between our CFO index and cash holdings, which suggests that
firms with strong CFOs (i.e., high values of the CFO index) hold less cash, ceteris paribus.
We verify the robustness of this finding through a series of tests. We firstly acknowledge that
the influence of CFOs on cash holding decisions may be constrained by the countervailing in-
fluence of CEOs, especially in firms where CEOs are more likely to retain the decision-making
authority over corporate policies within their control and delegate less to other high ranking
executives - such as the CFO (see e.g., Adams et al., 2005; Graham et al., 2015). We provide
suggestive evidence that the documented effect of CFOs on cash holdings goes beyond the
effect caused by CEOs. In particular, we find that the CFO effect is not only observable in
firms in which these policies are likely to be delegated to the CFO, but, importantly, also in
firms in which financial policies are more likely to be driven by the CEO.
We then address the issue of endogeneity that may be driving our results. We document
that our results remain robust to the inclusion of CEO-, board- and ownership-level controls
and they also hold after controlling for fixed effects (such as firm, CEO and CFO). These
tests alleviate potential concerns that our results are driven by omitted variable bias and/or
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. We then deal with potential simultaneity issues
due to matching (e.g., boards may appoint CFOs with particular characteristics that best
fits their firms cash policies). We present several tests to show that endogenous CFO-firm
matching is unlikely to drive our results. We first employ a propensity score matching
technique. In this analysis, we compare firms with strong CFOs with a matched sample of
5For example, a recent study by Mobbs (2018) reports that only about 11% of CFOs in US firms held a board
position over the period 1997-2014.
6The CFO presence on boards is not entirely surprising in the UK given that the UK Corporate Governance Code
encourages an appropriate balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board. For example, Principle B.1
of the Financial Reporting Council (2016) report states that “The board should include an appropriate combination of
executive and non-executive directors (and, in particular, independent non-executive directors) such that no individual
or small group of individuals can dominate the boards decision taking.” Whereas, the corporate governance and major
reforms in the US promote board independence as a practice that enhances board effectiveness (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002). A recent article published in the Wall Street Journal makes a similar point (see “A Waste of a Board
Seat” (Published on: October 15, 2012)).
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peer firms with weak CFOs that are similar in terms of several observable firm characteristics.
The analysis indicates that the firms with strong CFOs hold significantly less cash than
otherwise similar firms with weak CFOs. We find similar results after eliminating from the
sample all cases for which a CFO−firm matching is more likely (e.g., we drop firm-years in
which CFOs are newly appointed). We then exploit a sample of firms experiencing most
likely exogenous turnovers from weak to strong CFOs and vice-versa. We find that such
turnovers are associated with significant changes in cash holdings. In particular, turnovers
from weak to strong CFOs (strong to weak CFOs) are associated with a significant decline
(rise) in cash holdings. Finally, we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) approach, using the
number of financial experts sitting on other firms’ boards where the CFO also serves as a
non-executive director (termed as “NOFE”) as a potential instrument for our CFO index.
The results confirm our primary findings.
We consider two explanations for the negative association between cash holdings and our
CFO index. The first one lies in the lower precautionary demand for cash holdings (see
e.g., Han and Qiu, 2007; Bates et al., 2009; Lins et al., 2010) that strong CFO firms might
have. If strong CFOs have a higher ability in accessing external finance and/or the marginal
value of cash is lower in their firm, they are expected to be less inclined to hoard cash.
These effects are expected to be particularly strong for financially unconstrained firms due
to their lower precautionary demand for cash (see e.g., Han and Qiu, 2007). We find that
the negative relation between cash holdings and the CFO index is, indeed, more pronounced
for the sample of unconstrained firms. This implies that strong CFOs in firms with better
access to external finance are likely to have a weaker precautionary motive, which may
explain their tendency to hold less cash. We then demonstrate in a more formal way that
strong CFOs are better able to raise debt (external finance) in times of financial crisis,
which may induce them to avoid cash hoarding and to adopt more aggressive cash and other
financial/investment policies.7 We also analyze whether the value of cash holdings is affected
by a CFO’s decision to accumulate more cash. We find that the value of cash is significantly
7Further analysis clearly shows that strong CFOs are more likely to pay dividends and to invest in R&D and in
acquiring other firms (see Section 4.2).
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lower in strong CFO firms than in weak CFO firms. Interestingly, this result is only detected
in the sample of unconstrained firms, which indicates that shareholders may recognize the
weaker need of such firms to hoard cash and hence consider it less important. A second,
not mutually exclusive, explanation relates to the monitoring role that strong CFOs might
play (agency explanation). Sub-sample analysis, which includes firms partitioned by severe
financial constraints and agency costs proxies, provides support for the agency explanation
and the CFOs’ monitoring function in the governance process.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature investigating how managerial traits re-
late to corporate policies (see e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2005;
Chava and Purnanandam, 2010; Malmendier et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Custódio
and Metzger, 2014; Graham et al., 2015; and Ferris et al., 2017). Most of the existing litera-
ture primarily focuses on how CEO characteristics affect corporate cash and other financial
policies (see e.g., Liu and Mauer, 2011; Custódio and Metzger, 2014; Bernile et al., 2017;
and Deshmukh et al., 2017). Despite their importance, there is little empirical evidence on
the effect of CFOs on corporate cash policies, which may go beyond the effects caused by
CEOs. We extend this limited strand of literature by looking at the importance of CFOs
and developing an index that attempts to capture their ability to influence financial deci-
sions. Our paper is related to and builds on the studies of Chava and Purnanandam (2010),
Dittmar and Duchin (2015), Hoitash et al. (2016) and Mobbs (2018). Chava and Purnanan-
dam (2010) find that CEO risk incentives are more important than CFO risk incentives in
determining cash holding decisions. Dittmar and Duchin (2015) show that the CFOs who
have experienced distressing situations in previous firms tend to follow more conservative
cash policies. Hoitash et al. (2016) find that accountant CFOs are less likely to engage in ex-
ternal financing (only in high-growth industries), while the accounting background of CFOs
does not seem to be significantly associated with cash holdings. Mobbs (2018) documents
that firms with their CFOs on the board face fewer financial restrictions, and hence they
save less cash.
Our study complements and extends the above studies in at least two important ways.
First, rather than focusing on a particular CFO characteristic, we construct a comprehensive
7
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index that attempts to capture more effectively the ability of a CFO to influence financial
decision-making. We argue that while individual CFO-specific attributes such as board
membership and outside board experience are important, they should be regarded as si-
multaneous and complementary. This is because it is most likely the combination of these
attributes that determines whether a CFO’s ability to influence a financial policy is actually
realized. For example, while serving on the board of directors matters, a CFO’s prospect
of influencing cash policies also depends on other characteristics that determine his/er will
and skill to convincingly argue their positions and exert influence. Second, we attempt to
provide rational explanations for why firms with strong CFOs hold less cash. To the best of
our knowledge, the present study is the first to provide evidence on the weaker precautionary
motive for holding cash for firms with strong CFOs. We also provide evidence supporting
the monitoring role of strong CFOs in firms exposed to higher agency problems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data, variable
construction and presents summary statistics. In Section 3, we present our main empirical
results and deal with the endogeneity issue. Section 4 provides more evidence and offers
possible explanations for our main findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Sample Collection and Construction of Variables
2.1 Data Sources
Our dataset combines information from several sources. The variables used for creating the
CFO index are obtained from BoardEx. We use the BoardEx summary file to track the
CFOs of all UK listed companies. We identify CFOs based on the data item “individual
role” and by pinpointing the following titles: CFO, chief financial officer, finance director
(FD), group finance director (GFD) and executive director (finance).8,9 Board characteristics
8UK firms do not uniformly use the title of CFO. Many firms use other equivalent titles, such as Finance Director
(FD) or Group Finance Director (GFD), to designate the head of the finance department. For ease of exposition, the
common term CFO is used in this study.
9The CFO (or Finance Director) and the treasurer positions are two separate levels of financial positions in most
UK public corporations (in the US, the treasurer is usually designated the CFO). The CFO is commonly a full board
member with a complete oversight and control of an organization’s finance function, whereas the treasurer is seen
principally as the head of the treasury department, without the broader responsibilities. The treasurer typically
reports directly to the office of the CFO (along side other functional heads in finance such as the accountant, the
financial controller, and the compliance officer) (The Treasurer, 2001).
8
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are also obtained from BoardEx while ownership information is gathered from Thomson
Reuters (Ownership and Profiles). Firm characteristics and accounting information are from
Thomson Reuters - DataStream. Following prior literature on the subject, we exclude all
financial and utility firms from the analysis. Observations with missing values are also
excluded from the final sample. All continuous variables are winsorized at their 1st and
99th percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers. Our final sample covers the period
1998−2011 and contains 8,509 firm-year observations for 1,564 firms listed on the London
Stock Exchange. Our sample starts in 1998 because this is the first year of BoardEx coverage.
The Appendix provides detailed variable definitions.
2.2 Construction of the CFO Index
We construct an index that is based on several CFO-specific characteristics and attempts to
capture the extent to which a CFO exerts influence over corporate cash policies. We consider
six variables as potential attributes of our index. The first is CFO Executive Director, a
dummy variable that identifies whether the CFO is an executive director or not.10 We expect
that CFOs who hold board positions in their company to have high structural power; that is,
their senior positions in the organizational hierarchy enable them to establish stronger links
with the CEO and other board members due to their frequent meetings and interactions,
thus increasing their capacity to influence board decision making (Adams and Ferreira, 2007;
Bedard et al., 2014). Executive directors are also expected to exert considerable influence
over key corporate policies given their firm-specific knowledge and understanding about the
firm’s purpose (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
An executive’s potential authority to exert influence is enabled by his/er experience,
expertise, knowledge and skills (Castanias and Helfat, 2001; Adner and Helfat, 2003). We use
the following variables to capture CFOs’ human capital: CFO Financial Expertise, a dummy
variable that identifies whether the CFO holds a professional certification in accounting (e.g.,
ACA, FCA or CMA) or financial analysis (e.g., CFA) or not. Drawing on the findings of prior
literature on the financial expertise of directors (see e.g., Güner et al., 2008), we expect CFOs
10In the UK, an executive director is a member of the board who holds a senior management position in the
company.
9
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with financial expertise to have more influence on financial policies; CFO Outside Director, a
dummy variable that identifies whether the CFO holds an outside directorship or not. From a
labor market perspective, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that holding an outside directorship
is an indication of an executive’s greater reputation as an expert in decision-making in his/er
own firm. Based on this argument, Masulis and Mobbs (2011) argue that the enhanced labor
market reputation of these executives not only increases their credibility and influence on
their own board, but also makes them less reliant on their CEOs for career advancements.
This in turn enables them to be less susceptible to CEO influence; instead, they act as a
counter-power, enhancing board discipline over CEOs. We thus expect that a CFO with
an outside board membership is likely to be more influential in board decision making; and
CFO Seniority, the age of the CFO. The logic behind including CFO seniority in our index
is as follows. In order to influence a firm’s strategic decision, executives require sufficient
capabilities, experiences and confidence to act and/or take a stance in the boardroom that
challenges the CEO. These qualities and leadership skills accumulate over time and are more
likely to be present among senior members of the top management team (Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1996). Consistent with this reasoning, Golden and Zajac (2001) find that older
board members are more likely to influence changes in their firm’s strategic policies.11
Recognizing that the power dynamics within boardrooms affect the decision-making pro-
cess and board outcomes (see e.g., Raheja, 2005; Acharya et al., 2011), we include two
variables in our CFO index that capture the extent to which the CFO is in a powerful posi-
tion with respect to the CEO (and other executives). The first variable, CFO Relative Pay,
is defined as the ratio of the CFO’s total compensation, excluding equity-based awards, to
the CEO’s total compensation.12 Second, we use the variable CFO Top 3, a dummy variable
that identifies whether the CFO is among the top three highest-paid executives of the firm.
As argued in Finkelstein (1992), a manager’s compensation is considered to be an important
measure of his/er power derived from his/er structural position within the firm. Further-
more, a significant portion of executives’ compensation also reflects their outside opportunity
11We also use tenure instead of age and get similar results (See Section A.5 of the Internet Appendix).
12As a robustness test, we include equity-based compensation in the calculation of CFO relative pay as an alter-
native measure and the inferences remain the same (see Section A.5 of the Internet Appendix for details).
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wage, which in turn is determined by the managerial labor market based on their influence
within the firm (Fama, 1980). This suggests that while highly paid non-CEO executives are
likely to have greater influence over corporate decisions, they also have stronger incentives
to exert monitoring on entrenched CEOs. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) use similar measures
to capture the power or influence of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) within the organization.
We employ principal component analysis (PCA) to create our measure “CFO Index”.13
The main advantage of using PCA is that it enables us to combine the six variables men-
tioned above into a one-dimensional index, which attempts to capture more effectively the
ability of the CFO to influence corporate financial policies. By doing so, we control for
the potential multicollinearity problem that may arise when several CFO characteristics are
included independently in a model.
Panel A of Table 1 presents the results from the PCA, which yields one component with
an eigenvalue greater than one.14 This principal component captures 58.95% of the total
variance in our data and has an eigenvalue of 3.53. The corresponding component loadings
are also reported in this panel. As expected, all six variables used positively contribute to the
CFO index. We use this index to classify CFOs into two categories, those with scores greater
than the yearly median value of the CFO index (perceived as “Strong” or “More-Influential”
CFOs) and those with scores lower than the yearly median value of the CFO index (perceived
as “Weak” or “Less-Influential” CFOs). In Panel B of Table 1, we present the correlation
matrix of CFO variables used to construct the CFO index. Importantly, the results show a
strong positive correlation among most of the variables. For instance, the strong correlation
between CFO Top 3 and CFO Executive Director indicates that CFOs who are among the
top three highest-paid executives in their firm are more likely to sit on boards. Similarly,
senior and more qualified CFOs are more likely to earn higher compensation. Overall, the
high correlations among key CFO characteristics justify the use of PCA for constructing the
13PCA has been used extensively in recent studies for variables reduction purposes. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), for
example, use PCA to construct an index based on 6 variables to measure the strength of CROs and risk management
committee at bank holding companies. Florackis and Ozkan (2009) use PCA to combine 9 corporate governance
attributes to construct a managerial entrenchment index, which captures the extent to which managers have the
ability and incentives to expropriate wealth from shareholders.
14An eigenvalue greater than one indicates that the extracted component can explain more variance, i.e., it has
more explanatory power than any one of the original variables by itself.
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CFO index.
For robustness purposes, as discussed in Section 3.1, we extend/modify the set of at-
tributes that comprise our CFO index by using the following alternative measures: CFO
Tenure, defined as the number of years that the CFO has been with the firm; CFO Co-
option, a dummy variable that identifies whether the CFO was appointed into the current
position before the current CEO took office and 0 otherwise; CFO Relative Tenure, defined
as the ratio of the CFO’s tenure to the CEO’s tenure and CFO Pay Slice, defined as the
ratio of the CFO’s total annual compensation to the aggregate of total top five executives’
compensation. The results suggest that none of these variables adds significantly to the
information contained in the benchmark version of our index.
2.3 Validation of the CFO Index
We now proceed to perform a few tests to assess the extent to which the CFO index reflects
CFOs’ ability to influence board matters. First, we compare the average values of the CFO
index for the case of successful and less successful CFOs, as identified ex post. By looking
at CFO turnovers, we classify as “successful CFOs” those CFOs who were promoted to the
CEO position in their own or another company and as “less-successful CFOs” those who
were replaced from the CFO position following poor financial performance in their firm (i.e.,
bottom tercile in industry-adjusted ROA). We expect the value of the CFO index to be
higher for the case of successful CFOs. The results reported in Panel C of Table 1 show
that the average value of the CFO index is significantly higher in firms with successful CFOs
than those with less-successful CFOs. The mean and median differences in the CFO index
across the two sub-samples are statistically significant at the 5% level.
As a second validation test, we manually check the profiles of CFOs who have scored
very highly in our CFO index and examine whether CFOs with high scores correspond to
high-profile CFOs who made the news with their achievements. We find several examples
across our sample that confirm the accuracy of our CFO index. A good example of a strong
CFO is Keith Williams, whose index score is above the 90th percentile in the distribution
in 2010. Keith Williams served as the CFO and executive director of British Airways Plc.
12
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from 2006 to 2011. He also has been a non-executive director of Transport for London (TFL)
since 2008 and Iberia SA airlines since 2009. Mr. Williams is a chartered accountant with
the Institute of Chartered Accountant in England and Wales (ICAEW). In 2010, he won the
Finance Director of the Year Award. An article in Financial Director stated that “Keith
is a phenomenal financial director (FD) who has maintained a very strong finance function
for the business through the last couple of torrid years.”15 In 2011, Keith Williams was
promoted to CEO of British Airways.
Another good example of a strong CFO is Richard Pennycook, who scores above the 90th
percentile in our CFO index. Richard Pennycook served as the CFO and executive director
of Morrisons Plc. from 2005 to 2013. It is widely recognized that Richard Pennycook
was responsible for turnaround of Morrisons after the financial trouble of 2005 when the
takeover of Safeway Plc. and decline in market share led to a collapse in firm profits. An
article in CFO Magazine stated that “Richard Pennycook has helped yet another company
out of trouble−after cost cuts and an overhaul of the Morrisons brand, the chains’ profits
are rising and cash is being handed back to shareholders.”16 In 2013, Richard Pennycook
was presented with the Finance Director Lifetime Achievement Award.17 Recently, another
article in The Guardian stated that “He’s a details man, as he proved in a successful spell
as finance director of Morrison Plc.”18,19
15See “Keith Williams: BA’s Mr Nice” in Financial Director (Published on: December 20, 2010).
16See “Leadership in Finance: Morrisons’ Richard Pennycook” in CFO Magazine (Published on: May 7, 2009).
17See “Business Finance Awards 2013: The Winners” in Financial Director (Published on: March 07, 2013).
18See “Richard Pennycook was the best, or perhaps only, man for top Co-op job” in The Guardian (Published on:
September 4, 2014).
19Other examples from the list of CFOs whose index score is above the 90th percentile include Dr. Byron E. Grote
and John George Bason. Dr. Byron E. Grote served as the CFO and executive director of British Petroleum (BP)
Plc. in 2002-2011. He also served as a non-executive director of Unilever Plc since 2006, vice-chairman of UK HM
Treasury in 1998-2000 and economic advisor to the UK government in 2002-2005. He was the highest paid executive
in BP Plc. after CEO Dr. Anthony Bryan Hayward. John George Bason serves as the CFO and executive director of
Associated British Food Plc. (1999-present). John George Bason is the only executive in the firm who holds a board
position other than the CEO. He also serves as a non-executive director of Compass Group Plc. (2011-present). He
is a Chartered Accountant from ICAEW. He was also the second highest paid executive within the firm. In 2011,
John G. Bason was short-listed as FTSE-100 Finance Director of the Year in the FD’ Excellence Awards after a
continuous strong financial performance of the group (See “Associated British Food’s Bason’s career pointing in the
right direction” in Financial Director, Published on: May 18, 2011)
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2.4 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 2 provides key descriptive statistics. We find that 85.1% of CFOs in
our sample hold a board position and 25.7% of CFOs also sit on outside boards. The
average CFO is 46 years old and has a firm tenure of 3.1 years. Furthermore, 75.6% of
CFOs are among the top three highest-paid executives in their firm and 73.5% of CFOs in
our sample have a chartered qualification. The mean and median cash holdings are 15.2%
and 7.8%, respectively. The average firm in our sample reported total assets worth £1160
million, and also had a market capitalization of £967 million, a market-to-book ratio of
2.07, and a leverage ratio of 18%. The statistics presented in Table 2 also show that 54.4%
of firms in our sample pay an annual dividend and 32.8% of them invest in research and
development (R&D). The board-level data show that the composition of the board is well
balanced between executive and non-executive directors (i.e., board independence equals
52.7%). The average board size in our sample is 6.8 directors.
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of cash holdings in strong and weak CFO firms over
our sample period. The cash holdings increased across each sub-sample but the increase is
more pronounced for the case of weak CFO firms. The gap in cash holdings between strong
and weak CFO firms is more evident in the latter years of our sample. Panel B of Table
2 reveals important differences in cash holdings between strong and weak CFO firms. The
mean (median) cash holdings is 16.10% (8.50%) for the firms with weak CFOs, and 11.90%
(6.40%) for firms with strong CFOs. The t- and Wilcoxon-tests reject the null hypothesis
of equal means (medians) between the two samples at the 1% level. As shown in Panel B,
we find similar results using industry-adjusted and industry- and size-adjusted measures of
cash holdings. Overall, our preliminary analysis provides some initial evidence that strong
CFO firms tend to hold less cash than weak CFO firms.
3 Do CFOs Affect Cash Holdings?
This section establishes the relationship between the CFO index and cash holdings, disen-
tangles the effect of CFOs from that of CEOs on cash holdings, and addresses potential
endogeneity problems using a variety of methods.
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3.1 Benchmark Results
Table 3 presents the regression results on the relationship between cash holdings and our CFO
index. The baseline specification (Model 1) is a simple ordinary least squares panel regression
with standard errors clustered at the firm level to account for within-firm correlations. The
dependent variable is cash holdings, defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to
total assets.20 Our main independent variable of interest is the CFO index. All independent
variables including our CFO index are lagged by one year. Model 1 also includes the firm-
level controls suggested by Opler et al. (1999) and year/industry fixed effects.21 Analytical
definitions for these variables are provided in the Appendix. The results, as presented in
Table 3, support a negative association between the CFO index and cash holdings. This
suggests that firms with strong CFOs (i.e., high values of the CFO index) hold a lower
level of cash holdings, ceteris paribus. The economic magnitudes of these findings are also
significant. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in the CFO index (1.884) is
associated with a 6.20% decrease in cash holdings relative to the sample mean of 0.152.22
The coefficients on firm-level characteristics are consistent with the findings of Opler et al.
(1999) for US firms. We find that the coefficients on market-to-book, R&D, cash flow
volatility and capital expenditure are positive and statistically significant, which suggest
that firms with higher cash flow volatility, better investment opportunities and higher R&D
expenditures hold more cash. To the contrary, the coefficients on firm size, dividend, net
working capital and leverage are negative and statistically significant, which indicate that
large, dividend paying and highly leveraged firms hold less cash.
In Model 2 of Table 3, we include an additional set of CEO-, ownership- and board-
level controls and check whether the negative relationship between the CFO index and cash
holdings remains robust. The CEO-level controls include those used in other studies (see
e.g., Custódio and Metzger, 2014). These are: the natural logarithm of the CEO age, its
20For robustness purposes, we provide additional evidence in Section A.1 of the Internet Appendix using two
alternative measures of cash holdings, namely cash to sales ratio and the industry-adjusted cash to sales ratio.
21We check the robustness of our results using alternative cash specifications that include the firm level controls
proposed by Bates et al. (2009) and Oler and Picconi (2014) (see Section A.2 of the Internet Appendix).
22In Section A.3 of the Internet Appendix, we estimate our baseline specification after replacing the CFO index
with each of the six individual CFO components. Such analysis allows for an assessment of the economic significance
of each of the individual components on the cash holdings. However, the results in Model 7 of Table A.3 also raise
the possibility of multicollinearity when all six components are added simultaneously in the model.
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square term to account for possible non-linearity between CEO age and cash holdings, CEO
tenure, and CEO sex. Following Harford et al. (2008), we also include ownership and board-
level controls such as executive ownership, non-executive ownership, institutional ownership,
board size and board independence. We find the coefficient estimate for the CFO index
continues to be negative and statistically significant at the 1% level based on the results of
Model 2.23
In Model 3 of Table 3, we re-estimate our more general specification with firm fixed
effects, which controls for firm-specific unobserved time-invariant characteristics that might
drive the relationship between our CFO index and cash holdings. The estimates continue to
show a negative effect of the CFO index on cash holdings. This further eliminates our concern
that the firm-level unobserved heterogeneity could be driving our main results. In Models
4 and 5, we run a similar specification but with CEO and CFO fixed effects, respectively.
We are doing so because Bertrand and Schoar (2003) document that managers’ fixed effects
significantly matter for corporate financial policies. Our results show that in both cases
the coefficient on the CFO index continues to indicate a negative effect on cash holdings.24
Finally, following Opler et al. (1999), we report the results from a Fama and MacBeth (1973)
regression in Model 6.25 We find that the coefficient on the CFO index continues to remain
negative and statistically significant. Taken together, the evidence in Table 3 supports a
strong negative association between the CFO index and cash holdings.26,27
3.2 CFO versus CEO Effects
Our findings thus far suggest that CFOs significantly influence cash holding decisions. One
potential concern with this interpretation, however, is that there might be several firms in
23We also test for presence of multicollinearity. None of the correlations are high enough to create the collinearity
issues for our multivariate analysis. Our estimated mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 1.32.
24CEO sex is excluded from the model that includes CEO fixed effects for reasons of collinearity.
25The Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach helps to eliminate the cross-correlation in the residuals and produces
standard errors that are robust to year effects.
26In addition to the static panel data models, we also consider dynamic panel data models using the GMM
estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). An analytical
discussion on how these methods are implemented is provided in Section A.4 of the Internet Appendix. Our results,
as presented in Table A.4, verify a negative and statistically significant association between our CFO index and cash
holdings.
27In Section A.5 of the Internet Appendix, we provide additional evidence based on a set of modified CFO indexes.
In all cases, the results corroborate our main findings that strong CFOs hold significantly less cash, ceteris paribus.
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our sample in which the decision-making power is centralized in the hands of powerful CEOs
(Adams et al., 2005), who make most of the major decisions, including those concerning
corporate liquidity.28 We draw upon Graham et al. (2015) in arguing that the degree to
which a CEO retains formal decision-making authority and delegates the real decision-making
control over to other top executives − such as the CFO − depends on firm characteristics
such as the size and complexity of operations, and the CEO’s knowledge of a given policy.29
If our sample includes a large number of firms with powerful and possibly dominant CEOs,
this undermines our findings about the important role played by CFOs, which may be driven
by a small number of observations (CEO dominance hypothesis).
In this section, we perform subsample analysis to investigate the extent to which the
capacity of CFOs to influence cash policies is constrained by the countervailing influence
and will of CEOs. Based on the CEO dominance hypothesis, one would expect the negative
effect of the CFO index on cash holdings to be less pronounced (if at all) for firms whose
CEOs are either more powerful or less willing to delegate liquidity decisions to their CFOs.
Accordingly, we first split our sample into sub-samples of firms with High (Low) CEO power.
In particular, Panel A of Table 4, we use the following three measures of CEO power: CEO
Co-option, a dummy variable that indicates whether the CFO was appointed into the current
position after the current CEO took office. We draw the idea of co-option as a measure of
CEO power from Coles et al. (2014); CEO Relative Pay, defined as the ratio of the CEO’s
total compensation to the CFO’s total compensation; and CEO Pay Slice, defined as the
ratio of the CEO’s total annual compensation to the aggregate of total top five executives’
compensation (see Bebchuk et al., 2011). The first two measures capture the relative power
of the CEO over the CFO while the latter, his/er relative power vis-á-vis the board. For
CEO Co-option, firms in which the current CFO was hired after (before) the current CEO’s
appointment are categorized as high (low) CEO power firms. For CEO Relative Pay and
28Adams et al. (2005) argue that the decision-making authority is more likely to be centralized in the hands of
CEOs when they are more powerful. Thus, enabling them to consistently exert their will and influence key decisions
in their firms, even when such decisions are opposed by other senior executives.
29Graham et al. (2015) argue that CEOs are less likely to delegate decisions when they themselves are more
knowledgeable (e.g., having an MBA degree), although not so much in firms that are difficult to manage by a
sole decision-maker (e.g., large and complex firms) and therefore require more human capital input from other top
executives.
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CEO Pay Slice, we assign firms to the high (low) CEO power group if their value lies above
(below) the yearly median value of each measure of CEO power.
Additionally, in Panel B of Table 4, we split the sample into sub-samples of firms with a
“High-Degree” and “Low-Degree” of CEO delegation. Motivated by Graham et al. (2015),
we use three proxies to measure the degree of delegation in firms: Size, as measured by
sales revenue; Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Activity, a dummy variable that indicates
whether the firm completed at least one acquisition in a given year or not and Knowledge,
a dummy variable that indicates whether CEO has a Master of Business Administration
(MBA) degree. We classify firms into the high (low) degree of delegation group if they have
above (below) median yearly sales or they have (have not) completed at least one acquisition
in the previous year or they are led by CEOs without (with) an MBA degree.
Table 4 presents the results from the estimation of our cash models for the above sub-
groups. As expected, we find that the coefficient on the CFO index is negative and sta-
tistically significant for the sub-groups of firms in which financial policies are likely to be
delegated to the CFO (low CEO power and high degree of delegation). Importantly, this
negative relation is also observed in subgroups of firms in which these policies are more likely
to be driven by the CEO (high CEO power and low degree of delegation). As a matter of
fact, the coefficients on the CFO index are not statistically different across the high/low
CEO power and high/low degree of delegation subgroups. Collectively, these results reject
the CEO dominance hypothesis and instead suggest that the CFO effect we document in
this study goes beyond the effect caused by the CEO.
3.3 Dealing with Endogeneity
A major concern with our causal interpretation of the relation between our CFO index and
cash holdings is the endogeneity problem, which arises from three basic sources. The first is
omitted variables, which refers to variables that are likely to affect corporate cash holdings
and should be included in the vector of explanatory variables, but they are not because
they are not directly observable. The second is simultaneity or reverse causality, which
occurs when it can be argued that either X causes Y or that Y causes X. For example, in the
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context of our study, it is likely that boards may appoint CFOs with particular characteristics
that best fit their firms financial strategy (including cash holding policies), which creates a
matching problem. The third is measurement error, which occurs when an analysis includes
variables that may be measured imperfectly because they are not directly observable and
hence they are difficult to quantify (such as the CFO index developed in our study).
In the previous section, we tried to address the omitted variable bias by including a wide
range of CEO-, board- and firm-level controls in our cash specification. We also controlled
for firm-, CEO- and CFO-fixed effects to deal with omitted time-invariant variables that
may lead to a spurious correlation between our CFO index and cash holdings. However,
the inclusion of fixed effects does not address the endogeneity problem if there are time-
variant factors, such as firm/managerial preferences, that may affect both the dependent
and key explanatory variable. In this section, we address the aforementioned endogeneity
concerns in three ways. We first use a propensity score matching (PSM) approach. We then
employ two methods that rely on a source of exogenous variation for indentification, namely,
a difference-in-difference and an instrumental variables estimation.30
3.3.1 Propensity Score Matching
To address the endogenous CFO-firm matching concern discussed above, we employ a propen-
sity score matching technique as proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). This method
allows us to compare the cash holdings of two groups of firms that are similar in terms of
observable firm characteristics except that one is run by strong CFOs (treatment group)
and the other by weak CFOs (control group). This helps isolate the effect of CFOs on cash
holdings. We implement this procedure in two stages. In the first stage, we use a logistic
regression to calculate the probability (i.e., propensity score) that a firm with given charac-
teristics has a strong CFO. More specifically, we calculate the probability of being a strong
CFO firm as a function of firm size, market-to-book, net working capital, capital expendi-
ture, R&D, dividend, cash flow, cash flow volatility and leverage. In the second stage, we use
30As argued in Roberts and Whited (2013), the techniques aimed at addressing endogeneity concerns are classified
into two groups: (i) those that rely more on modelling assumptions (e.g. panel data and matching methods) and (ii)
those that rely on a source of exogenous variation.
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the calculated propensity scores to match each strong CFO firm with that of a similar firm
with a weak CFO. In doing so, we use the nearest-neighbour matching technique without
replacement (as suggested by Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).31 We find close matches for 1,561
strong CFO firm-year observations. Our final panel includes 3,122 observations.
In Panel A of Table 5, we present the results from a covariate balance test, which as-
sesses whether the average values of covariates (firm-level determinants) are similar across
treatment (strong CFO) and control (weak CFO) firms.32 The results show that all the
mean differences in firm characteristics between treatment and control firms are not statis-
tically significant. This ensures that the two sub-samples are similar with respect to various
observable firm-level characteristics.
We then report the average cash holdings for our treatment (strong CFO) and control
(weak CFO) firms in Panel B of Table 5. The results show that the average cash holdings
in strong CFO firms is 13.09% (about £151.84 million in cash and equivalents) as compared
to 14.45% (about £167.62 million in cash and equivalents) in similar firms with weak CFOs.
The mean difference in cash holdings is statistically significant at the 1% level. Consistent
with our univariate findings in Panel B of Table 2, the result suggests that strong CFO
firms hold less cash than weak CFO firms. We also re-examine the difference in (mean)
cash holdings between the two group of firms after removing all the firm-year observations
in which a CFO’s tenure is three years or less (i.e., newly appointed CFOs). The effects
of manager-firm matching on a firm’s outcome are particularly stronger when a manager is
newly appointed (Hirshleifer et al., 2012). We find that the average cash holdings continue to
remain significantly lower for the case of strong CFO firms. Overall, these findings mitigate
potential concerns that our finding of a negative association between the CFO index and
31To ensure an accurate matching, we require that (i) the maximum difference between the propensity scores of
the two groups does not exceed 0.01 in absolute terms, and (ii) the treated and control observations match exactly
on industry and year.
32In addition to the t-tests, we also report the normalized differences to assess the economic differences in matching
covariates (see e.g., Hoitash et al., 2012). The normalized difference is calculated as the difference in means for
treatment and match groups divided by the square root of the average of the group variances. A normalized difference
of 0.25 or less indicates an acceptable balance (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Similarly, all normalized differences are
less than 0.25, indicating that economic differences in covariates between the two groups of firms are also negligible.
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cash holdings are due to CFO-firm matching.33
3.3.2 Evidence from CFO Turnovers
An alternative setting to isolate the effect of CFOs on corporate cash policies is to focus
on firms that experience a CFO turnover from a weak to a strong CFO (or vice-versa) and
observe the corresponding change in cash holdings. Ideally, we would observe turnovers
that occur for purely exogenous reasons (e.g., sudden death of a CFO). Understandably, we
could only identify a very small number of purely exogenous CFO turnovers in our sample.
Therefore, we analyze a sub-sample of firms where CFO turnovers are likely to be exogenous,
but we cannot ignore the fact that some of them may not be. We start our analysis with
identifying firms that experienced a turnover from a weak to a strong CFO and vice-versa.
We exclude from our sample turnovers that are likely to have occurred for endogenous reasons
(e.g., forced turnovers). To identify forced turnovers, we conduct Bloomberg news searches
over a three-year period around CFO turnovers, examining all the articles and press releases
that allows us to determine the reason for each CFO turnover. We assign a CFO turnover
to a forced category if the article suggests that the CFO was “fired” by the board or had
“resigned” after the firm reported annual loss. As firms’ press releases on CFO changes
are often less informative, we create an alternative category called “suspected forced” CFO
turnovers, which are excluded from the analysis.34
After excluding potentially endogenous turnovers, we end up with a sample of likely
exogenous turnovers, which have occurred voluntarily for the following reasons: (i) to pursue
other career opportunities, (ii) early retirement, i.e., before the age of 60, (iii) resigned to join
a new firm, or (iv) appointed as a CEO at another firm (see e.g., Fee et al., 2013; Dittmar
33A potential limitation of propensity score matching techniques is that when used on its own, it cannot solve the
endogeneity problem because it does not rely on a clear source of exogenous variation for identification. For example,
it does not address endogeneity when selection occurs on unobservables (see Roberts and Whited, 2013 for a detailed
discussion).
34We assign turnover events in this category if (i) a firm’s industry-adjusted accounting performance as measured
by return on assets (ROA) falls into the lowest tercile in the pre-turnover year, or (ii) a firm facing severe financial
constraints as measured by industry-adjusted total debt (and interest coverage ratio) falls into the top (bottom)
tercile in the pre-turnover year, or (iii) a firm’s stock market performance as measured by excess returns falls into the
lowest tercile in the pre-turnover year, or (iv) a firm has a high level of agency costs as measured by asset turnover
(i.e., asset turnover falls into the lowest tercile of the sample distribution in the pre-turnover year), or (v) if the
turnover occurs during a crisis period. The boards are more likely to deliberately change their managers in crisis
periods (Fee et al., 2013).
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and Duchin, 2015). We expect a decline in the level of cash holdings when a weak CFO
is replaced by a strong CFO. Conversely, we expect an increase in cash holdings when a
strong CFO is replaced by a weak CFO. To isolate confounding effects on cash holdings, we
compare turnover firms (treatment group) with no-turnover firms (control group) that are
similar in terms of a series of observable characteristics such as firm size, market-to-book,
net working capital, capital expenditure, R&D, dividend, cash flow, cash flow volatility and
leverage.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results for the case when firms experience a turnover from
a weak to a strong CFO. In the pre-turnover period, we find no significant difference in cash
holdings between the treatment and control firms when run by weak CFOs, suggesting they
hold similar levels of cash. By contrast, the results indicate that in the post-turnover period,
the cash holdings of treatment firms were 5.5 percentage points lower than in the comparison
sample of control firms. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant at
the 1% level. Most importantly, we find that the decline in average cash holdings from
pre- to post-CFO turnover was 7.3 percentage points, which is over and beyond what was
observed during the same period among otherwise similar firms with no CFO turnovers. This
difference is also statistically significant at the 1% level. The results suggest that a turnover
from a weak to a strong CFO is associated with a significant decline in cash holdings. In
Panel B of Table 6, we repeat the analysis by looking at firms experiencing a turnover from a
strong to a weak CFO. Consistent with our expectations, the results indicate a 6.3 percentage
points increase in average cash holdings from pre- to post-CFO turnover, which is over and
beyond what was observed during the same period among otherwise similar firms with no
CFO turnovers. Overall, these results provide further evidence supporting the negative link
between the CFO index and cash holdings.
3.3.3 IV Estimation
To further address the potential endogeneity concerns, this section provides evidence based
on instrumental variable (IV). For the IV approach, we need an instrument that satisfies
the criteria of relevance (i.e., correlated with the CFO index) and exclusion (i.e., no direct
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effect on the cash holding decisions except through the CFO index) from both a theoretical
and econometric perspective as recommended by Larcker and Rusticus (2010). To identify a
suitable instrument, we focus on the financial expertise of the directors connected to the CFO.
In particular, we use the number of financial expert directors sitting on other firms’ boards
where the CFO also serves as a non-executive director (termed as “Number of Financial
Experts” (NOFE)) as a potential instrument for our CFO index.35 Based on the findings of
the literature on director networks, we hypothesize that the higher the number of financial
experts connected to the CFO, the higher the value for the CFO index. This is because
CFOs are likely to realize positive “externalities” from their enhanced professional network
(Dichev et al., 2013). For instance, informal conversations in their network of financial
experts can facilitate finance-specific human capital through the transfer and exchange of
knowledge from one expert to another (Geletkanycz et al., 2001; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005).
We thus expect to find a positive association between the number of financial experts and
the CFO index. The number of financial experts theoretically satisfies both the relevance
and exclusion requirements as we cannot identify any economic reasons that would lead us
to expect an association between NOFE and cash holdings, other than through our CFO
index.
Our two-stage approach is implemented as follows. In the first stage, the CFO Index
is regressed against NOFE and all the controls used in our baseline specification in Model
1 of Table 3. In the second stage, we use the predicted values estimated from the first
stage regression as a proxy for our CFO index, taking into account the possible selection
of appointing a strong CFO, and the similar firm-level controls. Models 1 and 2 of Table
7 presents the results from the first and second stage regression, respectively. As shown in
Model 1, the coefficient on NOFE is positive and statistically significant in the first stage
regression. This indicates that the number of financial experts in the CFO’s network have an
impact on the CFO index. To further assess the validity of our instruments, we also report
Kleinbergen-Paap rank Wald F -statistic for a weak instrument at the end of the first stage
35To ensure that the exclusion criteria is satisfied, we exclude all financial expert connections who also sit on the
board of directors at the CFO’s current firm (i.e., interlocking financial expert directors).
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regression (Model 1). The F -stat is 718.09 (above the cut-off value suggested by Stock et al.,
2002), which suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis that the instruments is weak.
In the second stage regression (Model 2), we find that the predicted effect of the CFO index
on cash holdings continues to remain negative and statistically significant.36,37
4 Why Do Firms with Strong CFOs Hold Less Cash?
The analysis so far has shown that firms with strong CFOs hold less cash, all else being
equal. In this section, we offer two plausible explanations for our findings, which lie on
strong CFOs’ weaker precautionary motive for holding cash as well as the monitoring role
that they seem to play in firms with higher agency problems.
4.1 Financial Constraints, Precautionary Motives and Agency Costs
Prior literature provides evidence on the precautionary motive for holding cash (see e.g.,
Bates et al., 2009), which seems to be stronger for financially constrained firms (see e.g.,
Han and Qiu, 2007). A recent survey study by Lins et al. (2010) also shows that CFOs make
liquidity decisions primarily based on precautionary reasons. Following this line of enquiry,
we conjecture that if strong CFO firms hold less cash due to their weaker precautionary
incentives for cash, then this behaviour should be particularly strong for financially uncon-
strained firms. We therefore re-estimate our baseline Model 1 from Table 3 on sub-samples
of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. We use the following three measures
of financial constraints: total debt, interest coverage ratio and the KZ index (Kaplan and
Zingales, 1997). Analytical definitions for these variables are provided in the Appendix. We
36One caveat on the IV approach is that, like all other methods used to address endogeneity, faces the trade-off
between external and internal validity (see Roberts and Whited, 2013 for a detailed discussion). A further limitation
of the IV approach is that in addition to the CFO index, there might be more endogenous regressors. As Roberts and
Whited (2013) note, “inference about all the regression coefficients can be compromised if one can find instruments
for only a subset of the endogenous variables.”
37We acknowledge that the methods above, when properly implemented, help mitigate reasonably well endogeneity
arising from omitted variables and simultaneity. However, they cannot tackle endogeneity arising from measurement
error. For example, as Roberts and Whited (2013) note, finding instruments for measurement error in corporate
finance is more difficult for finding instruments for simultaneity problems. We are aware of potential measurement
error problems in our analysis and we attempt to partly address them by checking the robustness of our results using a
series of alternative proxies for our dependent variable (see Section A.1 of the Internet Appendix) and key explanatory
variable (See Section A.5 of the Internet Appendix). We obviously acknowledge that the use of alternative proxies is
not a panacea for resolving error-in-variable problems.
24
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932832 
separate firms into constrained and unconstrained groups by using values for each of the
three proxies in year t-1. For debt ratio and the KZ index we assign firms to the financially
constrained (unconstrained) group if their value lies above (below) the yearly median value
of each measure of financial constraints. For interest coverage ratio, firms with a high (above
median) interest coverage ratio are assigned to the financially unconstrained group and the
remaining ones to the financially constrained one.
Panel A of Table 8 presents the regression results. We find that, under all constraints
criteria, the coefficient on the CFO index is consistently negative and statistically significant
at conventional levels for the case of financially unconstrained firms. Conversely, the coef-
ficient on the CFO index is consistently insignificant for constrained firms.38 These results
imply that strong CFOs in firms with better access to external finance (unconstrained) seem
to hoard less cash. In Panel B of Table 8, we also report the normalized differences in means
of our financial constraint proxies between strong and weak CFO firms. The normalized
differences of all three proxies of financial constraints are well below the threshold of 0.25.
This suggests that the economic differences in the financial constraint proxies between strong
and weak CFO firms are negligible.39 This rules out any concerns that the results in Panel
A of Table 8 are driven by non-random matching between strong CFO (weak CFO) firms
and financially unconstrained (constrained) firms.
An alternative (not mutually exclusive) explanation relates to the ability/incentives of
strong CFOs to serve a monitoring role in their firms (agency explanation). We conjecture
38As discussed below, this may be explained by the disciplinary role of debt in constrained firms, which makes
CFOs’ monitoring role less important.
39We acknowledge that, in equilibrium, our CFO index should be higher in the sample of financially unconstrained
firms. This is because strong CFOs improve financial decision making and firm’ overall financial health. However, it
is possible that firms experiencing operational and financial trouble may appoint strong CFOs to help them execute
a turnaround strategy. Indeed, after carefully inspecting our data, we identified several such cases in our sample.
For example, Andrew Lewis, who is a strong CFO according to our index, was appointed in 2008 by Avon Rubber, a
financially troubled company at the time, as a new Group Finance Director to turn it around and restore to strong
growth. Following a successful career of about 8 years at Avon Rubber, which was combined with prestigious awards
(e.g. Finance Director of the Year Award at the Quoted Company Awards in 2016 and the Young Finance Director
of the Year Award at the ICAEW Finance Directors Excellence Awards in 2011), he joined Chemring in 2017 at
the time when the company was struggling as a result of a debt overload. See “Andrew Lewis moves to Chemring
as group FD” in Economia (Published on: December, 2016). Another recent example of a strong CFO who was
appointed by a company in serious trouble is the case of Allan Stewart, who joined Tesco, the largest retail grocer
in the UK, at a period of declining sales, drop in market share and a high debt burden (among others). See article,
Tesco’s turnaround king, Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), 2016. This possibly explains (at
least partly) why the average values of our financial constraints proxies are not statistically different in the samples
of weak and strong CFO firms. We thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to conduct such analysis.
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that financially unconstrained firms are usually those that are exposed to higher agency costs
and hence they have higher monitoring needs. To the contrary, financially constrained firms
usually experience lower agency costs of carrying cash (see e.g., Hart, 1995 and Luo, 2011).
Based on the evidence of Table 8 that CFOs matter in financially constrained firms, we can
claim that our findings are also consistent with the agency explanation. For completeness, we
provide further sub-sample analysis by partitioning our sample by both financial constraints
and agency costs. In particular, in Panels A-C of Table 9, we partition the sample of
constrained (C) and unconstrained (UC) firms based on the following three measures of
agency costs: (i) asset turnover ratio (see Ang et al., 2000 and Singh and Davidson III,
2003), with firms with above (below) median asset turnover ratio classified as low (high)
agency cost firms; (ii) the ratio of selling, general and administration (SG&A) to total sales
(see Singh and Davidson III, 2003 and Florackis and Ozkan, 2009), with firms with below
(above) median SG&A ratio classified as low (high) agency cost firms; and (iii) a measure of
excess cash holdings (calculated as the deviation from optimal cash holdings as determined
by Opler’s et al., 1999 model),40 with firms with excess cash classified as high agency cost
firms.
Our results, as presented in Table 9 show that, within unconstrained firms, the nega-
tive effect of strong CFOs on cash holdings is driven by the sub-sample of firms that are
exposed to higher agency costs. This further supports the view that strong CFOs fulfill a
monitoring role in such firms. For the case of constrained firms, the effect of CFOs on cash
holdings is less pronounced and insignificant in our full-sample estimates and most of the
subsamples considered. This is in line with the view that financial constraints themselves
play a disciplinary role in cash dissipation, which perhaps makes CFOs’ monitoring role less
important.41
4.2 Access to Finance and Other Corporate Policies
In the present section, we firstly investigate in a more direct way whether firms with strong
CFOs have better access to external financing. In addition to our full-sample analysis,
40In the spirit of Jensen (1986), we treat excess cash holdings as a proxy of agency problems of free cash flow.
41We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to consider this alternative explanation.
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we also focus and pay particular attention on the recent credit crisis of 2008−2009, which
provides an interesting setting. This is because, during a period of financial stress, firms
are more likely to be financially constrained due to a significant shortage in credit supply
and availability of external funds (Campello et al., 2010; Campello et al., 2011; Cresṕı and
Mart́ın-Oliver, 2015). In particualr, we estimate the following model:
Debt Issuei ,t = β0 + β1 CFO Indexi ,t−1 + β2 Crisis 2008−2009 +
β3 (CFO Indexi ,t−1 x Crisis 2008−2009 ) + Σγk Controls i ,t−1 + νi ,t (1)
Debt Issue is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm issues “New Debt”
in a given year and zero otherwise. This is debt issued minus debt retired from fiscal year
t-1 to t. The dummy variable “Crisis 2008−2009” takes the value of one for the years 2008
and 2009, and zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable of interest is the interaction
term, CFO Indexi ,t−1 x Crisis 2008−2009 . This interaction term intends to capture the
ability of strong CFO firms to raise external finance in times of crises.
Table 10 presents the results. The results of Model 1, which only includes the CFO
Indexi ,t−1 , Crisis 2008−2009 and the interaction term, show that the coefficient of Crisis
2008−2009 is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting a significant
tightening in the availability of credit during the financial crisis. Focusing on our main
variable of interest, we find that the coefficient on CFO Indexi,t−1 and Crisis 2008−2009
interaction is positive and significant. One interpretation of this finding is that the significant
negative effect of the crisis dummy on debt issuance is less pronounced for strong CFO firms.
In Model 2 of Table 10, we find similar results after controlling for the same set of firm -,
board-, ownership- and CEO-level characteristics, as in our more general cash specification of
Table 3. The results suggest that strong CFO firms have better access to external finance even
under tighter credit conditions, which may weaken their motive for holding cash. Overall,
these results are consistent with the view that the firms with strong CFOs may have a weaker
precautionary motive and as a result they may follow more aggressive cash policies (hold
less cash).
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In addition to their access to external financing, as analytically discussed in Section A.6
of our Internet Appendix, we also examine the effect of strong CFOs on other corporate
(financial and investment) policies. In exploring these policies, we draw on the findings
of prior literature on the association between managerial characteristics and firm outcomes
(e.g., Custódio and Metzger, 2014; Dittmar and Duchin, 2015), and in particular, on the
importance of CFOs’ role in shaping key corporate policies (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003;
Graham et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2015). More specifically, we investigate the relationship
between our CFO index and the following six policies: firm leverage, debt maturity, dividend
policy, capital expenditure, R&D investment and M&A activity. We find that strong CFOs
invest more in R&D and M&A, and are more likely to pay dividends. These findings are
consistent with our reasoning that strong CFOs may have weaker precautionary motive for
holding cash, which may explain their “aggressive” behaviour when it comes to R&D, M&A
and payout policies.42
4.3 The Value of Cash in Firms with Strong CFOs
Our results so far imply that the firms with strong CFOs hold less cash because they may
have better access to external financing. In this section, we focus on the value of cash
holdings in strong CFO firms. We conjecture that if these firms have access to external
means of financing, then shareholders might place a lower value on their cash holdings. To
investigate this, we follow the methodology developed by Faulkender and Wang (2006) to
measure the marginal value of cash holdings in strong and weak CFO firms. To do so, we
extend Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) excess return model by including Strong CFOi ,t−1
and an interaction term Strong CFOi ,t−1 x ∆Cashi ,t . In particular, we estimate the following
regression model:
42We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting us to examine the effect of strong CFOs on other corporate
policies.
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ri ,t − RBi ,t = α + β1
∆Cashi ,t
MVi ,t−1
+ β2
∆Earningi ,t
MVi ,t−1
+ β3
∆Net Assetsi ,t
MVi ,t−1
+ β4
∆R&Di ,t
MVi ,t−1
+β5
∆Interest Expensei ,t
MVi ,t−1
+ β6
∆Dividendi ,t
MVi ,t−1
+ β7
Cashi ,t−1
MVi ,t−1
+β8Leveragei ,t + β9
New Financingi ,t
MVi ,t−1
+ β10
Cashi ,t−1
MVi ,t−1
x
∆Cashi ,t
MVi ,t−1
+β11Leveragei ,t x
∆Cashi ,t
MVi ,t−1
+ β12Strong CFOi ,t−1
+β13Strong CFOi ,t−1 x
∆Cashi ,t
MVi ,t−1
+ errori ,t (2)
where, ∆Xi ,t indicates the change in the variable X of firm i from year t-1 to t. All the
independent variables except Strong CFOi ,t−1 and Leverage are scaled by lagged market
value of equity, MVt−1. Analytical definitions for all variables are provided in the Appendix.
The dependent variable is the excess stock return, ri ,t − RBi ,t , where, ri ,t is the stock return
from year t-1 to t and RBi,t is the stock i’s benchmark return over the same period.
43 The key
variable in the equation is Strong CFOi ,t−1 x ∆Cashi ,t . StrongCFOi ,t−1 is a dummy variable
that equals to one if the CFO index value is greater than the median value of the CFO index
across all firms in the given year, and zero otherwise. ∆Cashi ,t is change in cash holdings
from year t-1 to t. The coefficient (β13 ) on this interaction term represents the difference
in the marginal value of one pound between strong CFO firms and weak CFO firms. We
include the same control variables as in Faulkender and Wang (2006).
We first present the results (Column 1 of Table 11) from estimating our regression model
(Equation (2)) on the entire sample. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term,
Strong CFOi ,t−1 x ∆Cashi ,t is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. As re-
ported in Panel B (Column 1) of Table 11, we find that the marginal value of £1 of cash
for strong CFO firms is £0.62, whereas the value of extra £1 of cash for weak CFO firms
is £0.89. These results indicate that the marginal value of £1 increase in cash for firms
43To construct benchmark portfolio returns, we use the 25 Fama−French portfolios formed on size and book-to-
market. We then match benchmark returns to actual returns by grouping each firm-year observation into one of
the 25 Fama−French portfolios based on the intersection between size and book-to-market. The stock return of the
corresponding Fama-French portfolio is regarded as the benchmark return for that firm-year observation.
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with strong CFOs is valued 27 pence less than in firms with weak CFOs. This confirms
our conjecture that the market places a lower value on an extra pound of cash for strong
CFO firms possibly because they have better access to external finance as compared to their
weaker counterparts.44,45
To gain further insights into the observed negative relation, we split the sample into sub-
samples of financially constrained and unconstrained firms based on each of three proxies of
financial constraint discussed in Section 4.1. The studies by Faulkender and Wang (2006)
and more recently by Denis and Sibilkov (2009) show that cash holdings are less valuable
for firms that have easier and cheaper access to outside funds. Accordingly, we expect
that the negative association between strong CFO firms and value of cash holdings to be
particularly pronounced for financially unconstrained firms, which are generally characterized
by a weak precautionary motive. As expected, our results show that the interaction between
Strong CFOi ,t−1 and change in cash holdings (∆Cashi ,t) is negative, though not consistently
significant, only for the case of financially unconstrained firms. This further supports our
conjecture that shareholders may recognize the weaker need of such firms to hoard cash and
hence consider it less important (precautionary motive explanation).
Conversely, we find that the interaction term is positive and statistically significant at
conventional levels for financially constrained firms under all three constraints criteria. These
results imply that strong CFOs in financially constrained firms help increase the value of cash
holdings to their shareholders when such firms are more likely to face financial constraints
(see calculations in Panel B of Table 11).
44To calculate the marginal value of cash holdings, we use the coefficient estimates of four items (i.e.,
Strong CFOi,t−1 x ∆Cashi,t , ∆Cashi,t , Cashi,t−1 X ∆Cashi,t , Leveragei,t X ∆Cashi,t). The calculation is as follows:
the mean firm has cash holdings (lagged) equal to 14.67% of the market capitalization of equity, and the mean lever-
age ratio (i.e. debt to debt plus the market capitalization of equity) is 18.89%. Therefore, the marginal value of £1
(based on the estimates in Full Sample, Column 1 of Table 11) to shareholders in strong CFO firms is £0.62 [= 1.134
+ (-0.271) + (-0.174 x 14.67%) + (-1.104 x 18.89%)], whereas the value of extra cash for weak CFO firms is £0.89.
45Halford et al. (2016) proposed a modification to the regression framework developed by Faulkender and Wang
(2006) to estimate the value of cash holdings. They argue that the sensitivity of stock price to the various component
of new financing (i.e., sale of stock, purchase of stock, debt issuance and debt repurchase) is likely to vary and therefore
should be included separately in the regression model. In untabulated tests, we incorporate this modification and
re-estimate the regression models of Table 11. We find that our results are robust to this modification.
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5 Conclusion
This study investigates the effect of CFOs on corporate cash policies. We construct an
index that attempts to capture the ability of the CFO to influence firm outcomes. This
index is based on a set of CFO-specific attributes such as board membership, outside board
directorship, seniority (as proxied by age and/or tenure), level of financial expertise, pay
status (if the CFO is among the top three paid executives) and relative pay status (compared
to the CEO). Based on this index, we distinguish companies into those with strong (or more
influential) CFOs and those with weak (or less influential) CFOs.
We examine the effect of CFOs on cash holdings using a large sample of UK firms and
find that firms with strong CFOs hold less cash, ceteris paribus. Importantly, the negative
effect documented in our study goes beyond the effect caused by the CEO. We provide
evidence that suggests that strong CFOs matter to corporate cash policies independently of
whether or not their firms are led by powerful and possibly dominant CEOs. These results
are robust to the inclusion of CEO-, board- and ownership-level characteristics, alternative
model specifications, managerial and firm fixed effects, alternative cash model specifications,
alternative measures of the CFO index and various tests that address endogeneity. Lastly, we
provide possible explanations for the negative association between the CFO index and cash
holdings. Our analysis shows that firms with strong CFOs are well positioned to hold less
cash due to their weaker precautionary motive. Strong CFOs also seem to play a monitoring
role in their firms, which is demonstrated by the fact that they reduce cash holdings only in
firms with higher agency costs.
The complexity of the finance function demands a deep understanding of the traits that
make a good CFO. The present study puts forward the case that while several CFO-specific
attributes such as board membership, outside board experience and financial expertise are
important, they should be regarded as simultaneous and complementary. The insight of our
study that strong CFOs are less susceptible to CEO influence, and as a result they have
the ability to shape key corporate policies, has important implications for policymakers and
practitioners of corporate governance. Our findings, for example, may be helpful in future
deliberations and debates about the internal functioning and effectiveness of boards, and the
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changing role of the CFO. They also have important economic implications by suggesting
that the appointment of strong CFOs can help companies avoid unnecessary cash hoarding,
an action that may boost investment and strengthen business and economic activity.
We suggest two potentially fruitful avenues for future research. First, to examine how
strong CFOs dissipate (excess) cash (e.g., whether they can help prevent value-destroying
M&A deals). Second, to consider alternative explanations that account for the effect of CFO
behavioural traits (e.g., overconfidence) on corporate cash policies (see e.g., Malmendier
et al., 2016).
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Cresṕı, R., Mart́ın-Oliver, A., 2015. Do family firms have better access to external finance
during crises? Corporate Governance: An International Review 23 (3), 249–265.
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Appendix
Data Definitions
CFO Characteristics
CFO Executive Director Dummy variable coded 1 if the CFO sits on the board of directors and
0 otherwise.
CFO Outside Director Dummy variable coded 1 if the CFO sits on at least one outside board
and 0 otherwise.
CFO Seniority The age of the CFO in years.
CFO Financial Expertise Dummy variable coded 1 if the CFO has a chartered qualification in ac-
counting or financial analysis (Chartered Accountant (CA), Associate
Chartered Accountant (ACA), Fellow Chartered Accountant (FCA),
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), Chartered Management Accountant
(CMA) and Chartered Secretary) and 0 otherwise.
CFO Top 3 Dummy variable coded 1 if the CFO is among the three highest paid
executives and 0 otherwise.
CFO Relative Pay Ratio of the CFO’s total compensation, excluding equity-based awards,
to the CEO’s total compensation.
CFO Tenure Number of years that the CFO has been with the firm.
CFO Co-option Dummy variable coded 1 if the CFO was appointed into the current
position before the current CEO took office and 0 otherwise.
CFO Relative Tenure Ratio of the CFO’s tenure to the CEO’s tenure.
CFO Pay slice Ratio of the CFO’s total annual compensation to the aggregate of to-
tal top five executives’ compensation. Following Feng et al. (2011), if
BoardEx discloses less than five executives, we assume the undisclosed
executives receive the same pay as the lowest paid executive among those
disclosed.
CFO Index First principal component from a principal component analysis based on
the following variables: CFO executive director, CFO outside director,
CFO seniority, CFO financial expertise, CFO top 3 and CFO relative
pay.
Mod. CFO Index (1) First principal component from a principal component analysis based on
the following variables: CFO executive director, CFO outside director,
CFO tenure, CFO financial expertise, CFO top 3 and CFO relative pay.
Mod. CFO Index (2) First principal component from a principal component analysis based on
the following variables: CFO executive director, CFO outside director,
CFO tenure, CFO financial expertise, CFO top 3, CFO relative pay and
CFO co-option.
Mod. CFO Index (3) First principal component from a principal component analysis based on
the following variables: CFO executive director, CFO outside director,
CFO relative tenure, CFO financial expertise, CFO pay slice and CFO
relative pay.
Number of Financial Experts (NOFE) Number of financial expert directors (i.e. have a chartered qualification
in accounting or financial analysis, are in finance-related roles such as
CFOs, finance directors or equivalent, or current CEOs with past CFO
experience) in BoardEx sitting on other firms’ board where the CFO also
serves as a non-executive director.
Firm Characteristics
Return on Assets (ROA) Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA) to total assets.
Cash Holdings Ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total assets.
Industry adjusted Cash Holdings Cash holdings minus yearly median industry level of cash holdings.
Industry-size adjusted Cash Holdings Cash holdings minus yearly median industry and size level of cash hold-
ings.
Firm Size Natural log of book value of total assets.
MV The market value of equity.
Net Assets Total assets minus cash and marketable securities.
Net Working Capital Net working capital minus cash divided by net assets.
Capital Expenditure (Capex) Ratio of capital expenditures to net assets.
Research and Development (R&D) Dummy variable coded 1 if firms invest in R&D and 0 otherwise. Firms
that do not report R&D expenses are considered to be firms with no
R&D expenses.
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Appendix (Continued)
Cash-to-Sales Ratio of cash and marketable securities to sales, as in Harford (1999)
Industry adjusted Cash-to-Sales Cash-to-sales minus yearly median industry level of cash-to-sales.
Dividend Dummy variable coded 1 if a firm pays dividend in current year and 0 oth-
erwise.
Market-to-Book Ratio Ratio of the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the
market value of equity to the book value of assets.
Cash Flow Earnings after interest, common dividends and taxes but before depreciation
divided by net assets.
Leverage Ratio of long term debt plus short term debt to total assets.
Cash Flow Volatility Standard deviation of the firm’s cash flow over the prior ten-years period.
Board and Ownership Characteristics
Board Size Number of members sitting on the board of directors.
Board Independence Ratio of number of non-executive directors to the total number of directors.
Executive Ownership Proportion of equity owned by executive directors.
Non-executive Ownership Proportion of equity owned by non-executive directors.
Institutional Ownership Proportion of equity owned by all institutional investors with at least 3%
stake.
CEO Characteristics
CEO Age Natural log of the CEO age.
CEO Tenure Natural log of number of years the CEO has been with the firm.
CEO Co-option Dummy variable coded 1 if the CFO was appointed into the current position
after the current CEO took office and 0 otherwise.
CEO Relative Pay Ratio of the CEO’s total compensation, excluding equity-based awards, to
the CFO’s total compensation.
CEO Pay Slice Ratio of the CEO’s total annual compensation to the aggregate of total top
five executives’ compensation. Following Feng et al. (2011), if BoardEx dis-
closes less than five executives, we assume the undisclosed executives receive
the same pay as the lowest paid executive among those disclosed.
Size (Sales Revenue) Natural log of sales revenue.
Mergers and Acquisitions Activity Dummy variable coded 1 if a firm completes one or more acquisition in a
given year and 0 otherwise.
CEO Knowledge Dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO has a masters of business administration
(MBA) degree and 0 otherwise.
Other Firm Characteristics
Acquisition Dummy variable coded 1 if a firm acquires assets in current year and 0
otherwise.
Cash From Operations Ratio of cash from operation to net assets.
Sales Growth Ratio of current net sales minus prior year net sales to prior year net sales.
Firm Age Natural log of the number of years the firm has DataStream data, calculated
as the difference between the firm’s fiscal year less the date that the firm was
included in the DataStream dataset (plus one).
Tax Burden on Foreign Income The variable is calculated following Oler and Picconi’s (2014) “alternative
tax on repatriating earnings” variable defined as: (Foreign pre-tax income x
UK Corporate tax rate of 20 %) less foreign income taxes paid divided by
net assets.
Financial Constraints
Debt Total debtt/Market Valuet
Interest Coverage Ratio Earnings Before Interest and Taxest/Total Interest Expense Ratiot
Kaplan-Zingales (KZ) Index KZ = -1.002 * (Cash flowt/Property, Plant and Equipmentt−1) + 0.283 *
Tobins Qt + 3.139 * (Total debt/Total capitalt) 39.368 * (Dividend Paidt
/ Property, Plant and Equipmentt−1) 1.315 * (Cash holdingst/ Property,
Plant and Equipmentt−1)
Agency Costs
Asset Turnover Ratio Ratio of total sales to total assets.
SG&A Ratio Ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total sales (SG&A)
Excess Cash holdings Deviation from optimal cash holdings as determined by Opler’s et al., 1999
model.
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Appendix (Continued)
Value of Cash
ri,t Stock return from fiscal year t-1 to t
RBi,t Stock i’s benchmark return over fiscal year t-1 to t. The benchmark portfolio is one of the
25 Fama and French portfolios formed on size and book-to-market ratio.
Excess Return ri,t − RBi,t
MV Market value of equity at year t-1 computed as price multiplied by shares outstanding.
Cash Cash and marketable securities in year t.
∆X Compact notation for the 1-year change, Xt − Xt−1.
∆Earning Change in earnings before extraordinary items from year t-1 to t.
∆R&D Change in R&D expenses from year t-1 to t.
∆Interest Expense Change in interest expenses from year t-1 to t.
∆Dividend Change in cash dividend paid from year t-1 to t.
Leverage Total debt to debt plus market value of equity in time period t.
New Financing Net new equity issued (equity issues minus repurchase) plus net new debt issue (debt issued
minus debt retired).
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Figure 1
Evolution of Cash Holdings in Strong and Weak CFO Firms
This figure depicts the evolution of average cash holdings in strong and weak CFO firms over the
period 1999−2011. Strong CFO firms (grey line) are those firms whose CFO Index is greater than
the median CFO Index across all firms in year t. Weak CFO firms (black line) are those firms
whose CFO Index is lower than the median CFO Index across all firms in year t. The dotted
line shows the average cash holdings of all firms in our sample. The CFO Index is constructed
after combining six CFO attributes using principal component analysis as discussed in Section
2.2. Cash holdings is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value
of total assets.
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Table 1
Construction of the CFO Index
Panel A presents the results from a principal component analysis (PCA) based on the following
CFO attributes: CFO executive director, CFO outside director, CFO seniority, CFO financial
expertise, CFO top 3 and CFO relative pay. CFO index is the first principal component obtained
from the PCA. Component loadings of the first component, the eigenvalue and the proportion
of variance explained by the first component is presented. Panel B reports the correlation
coefficients among the CFO attributes. Panel C presents a validation test, which compares the
mean and median (in brackets) values of the CFO index for the case of successful and less successful
CFOs, as identified ex post. Successful CFOs are those who took the CEO role in their own or
another company, while less successful CFOs are those who were replaced from the CFO position
following poor financial performance in their firm (i.e. bottom tercile in industry-adjusted ROA).
The t-statistic is for the difference in means and the Wilcoxon-test is for the difference in medians
between successful and less successful CFOs. p-values are reported in parentheses. ** denotes
statistical significance at the 5% level. Analytical definitions for all variables are provided in the
Appendix.
Panel A: Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Principal Component Components Component loadings
CFO Index CFO Executive Director 0.50
CFO Outside Director 0.18
CFO Seniority 0.49
CFO Financial Expertise 0.42
CFO Top 3 0.43
CFO Relative Pay 0.30
Eigenvalue 3.53
Proportion Explained 58.95 %
Panel B: Correlation Among CFO Attributes
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. CFO Executive Director 1.000
2. CFO Outside Director 0.260 1.000
3. CFO Seniority 0.931 0.276 1.000
4. CFO Financial Expertise 0.746 0.177 0.695 1.000
5. CFO Top 3 0.727 0.182 0.693 0.531 1.000
6. CFO Relative Pay 0.449 0.107 0.431 0.333 0.399 1.000
Panel C: Validation of the CFO Index
Less Successful Successful t-statistics Wilcoxon z-test
CFOs CFOs (p-values) (p-values)
CFO Index 0.69 0.93 −2.464** −2.298**
[ 0.79 ] [ 0.97 ] (0.014) (0.021)
No. of CFOs 183 115 - -
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for the key variables used in our analysis. Analytical
definitions for all variables are provided in the Appendix. Panel A presents the summary statis-
tics. The final sample consists of 9,655 firm-year observations on CFO characteristics between
1998-2011. Of these observations, 8,509 firm-years have complete information on firm- and CEO-
level controls, while 6,353 firm years have available information on ownership measures. Panel B
presents a univariate comparison of the mean and median (in brackets) cash holdings of the weak
CFO and strong CFO firms. Strong CFO firms are those firms whose CFO index is greater than
the median CFO index across all firms in year t. Weak CFO firms are those whose CFO index
is lower than the median CFO index across all firms in year t. The CFO index is constructed
after combining six CFO attributes using principal component analysis as discussed in Section
2.2. The t-statistic is for the difference in means and the Wilcoxon-test is for the difference in
medians. p-values are reported in parentheses. *** denote statistical significance at the 1% level,
respectively.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Mean Median S.D. 25% 75%
CFO Executive Director 0.851 1.000 0.356 1.000 1.000
CFO Outside Director 0.257 0.000 0.437 0.000 1.000
CFO Seniority 46.470 46.000 7.070 41.000 51.000
CFO Financial Expertise 0.735 1.000 0.442 0.000 1.000
CFO Top3 0.756 1.000 0.429 1.000 1.000
CFO Relative Pay 0.541 0.552 0.620 0.000 0.713
CFO Index −0.002 0.788 1.884 −0.121 1.122
Cash Holdings 0.152 0.078 0.192 0.027 0.194
Firm Size 11.198 11.041 2.310 9.557 12.713
Total Assets (in £ millions) 1159.282 62.380 3542.169 22.043 500.500
MV (in £ millions) 966.948 85.500 2918.337 19.260 425.440
Net Working Capital −0.027 −0.008 0.363 −0.127 0.123
Capital Expenditure 0.057 0.032 0.075 0.012 0.070
R&D 0.328 0.000 0.470 0.000 1.000
Dividend 0.544 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000
Market-to-Book 2.074 1.429 2.102 1.061 2.177
Cash Flow −0.150 0.052 0.810 −0.059 0.102
Leverage 0.180 0.131 0.201 0.005 0.279
Cash Flow Volatility 0.250 0.059 0.543 0.024 0.180
Board Size 6.817 6.000 2.498 5.000 8.000
Board Independence 0.527 0.500 0.153 0.400 0.625
Executive Ownership 0.080 0.011 0.139 0.001 0.095
Non-Executive Ownership 0.035 0.001 0.082 0.000 0.020
Institutional Ownership 0.202 0.171 0.177 0.045 0.317
CEO Age (log) 3.915 3.932 0.155 3.807 4.025
CEO Tenure (log) 1.012 1.099 1.153 0.336 1.825
Panel B: Univariate Comparison
Weak CFO Strong CFO t-statistics Wilcoxon z-test
Firms Firms (p-values) (p-values)
Cash Holdings 0.161 0.119 11.343*** 9.687***
[ 0.085 ] [ 0.064 ] (0.000) (0.000)
Industry adj. Cash holdings 0.069 0.033 10.197*** 7.543***
[ 0.001 ] [ −0.008 ] (0.000) (0.000)
Industry-size adj. Cash holdings 0.051 0.030 6.513*** 4.008***
[ 0.001 ] [−0.001 ] (0.000) (0.000)
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Table 3
CFOs and Cash Holdings
This table presents the results from several regressions on the relationship between cash holdings
and our CFO Index. In Models 1 and 2, we use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with
standard errors clustered at the firm level. In Models 3, 4 and 5, we add firm, CEO and CFO
fixed effects, respectively. In Model 6, we use a Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression approach. In
our baseline Model 1, we extend the Opler’s et al. (1999) cash model by adding our CFO Index as
an additional explanatory variable. In Models 2-6, we add board-, ownership- and CEO-specific
characteristics. The dependent variable is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities
to the book value of total assets. The CFO Index variable is constructed after combining six CFO
attributes using principal component analysis as discussed in Section 2.2. All independent vari-
ables are lagged by one year. Analytical definitions for all variables are provided in the Appendix.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
CFO Index −0.005*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.006*** −0.003** −0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Size −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.017*** −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Net Working Capital −0.102*** −0.110*** −0.156*** −0.173*** −0.172*** −0.122***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016)
Capital Expenditure 0.181*** 0.188*** 0.265*** 0.239*** 0.221*** 0.154***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
R&D 0.029*** 0.030*** −0.009 −0.009 0.011 0.030***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003)
Dividend −0.020*** −0.027*** −0.009* −0.013** −0.014** −0.029***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Market to Book 0.005** 0.004** −0.005*** −0.005*** −0.003** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Cash Flow −0.059*** −0.068*** −0.045*** −0.037*** −0.034*** −0.068***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Leverage −0.291*** −0.291*** −0.238*** −0.253*** −0.240*** −0.274***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Cash Flow Volatility 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.007 0.013** 0.003 0.041***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Board Size - 0.002** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.003*** 0.001*
- (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Board Independence - 0.044*** 0.005 0.014 0.015 0.033***
- (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.008)
Executive Ownership - 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001***
- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Non-Executive Ownership - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutional Ownership - 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000***
- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Age - −0.196 −1.197** −2.853* 0.093 −0.314
- (0.484) (0.508) (1.467) (0.558) (0.712)
CEO Age2 - 0.018 0.148** 0.391* −0.016 0.034
- (0.062) (0.065) (0.230) (0.072) (0.091)
CEO Tenure - 0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003 0.002
- (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
CEO Sex - −0.040*** 0.004 - −0.045*** −0.056***
- (0.014) (0.015) - (0.017) (0.017)
Intercept 0.213*** 0.707 2.788*** 5.502** 0.231 0.965
(0.030) (0.942) (0.991) (2.326) (1.085) (1.366)
Observations 8,509 6,353 6,353 6,353 6,353 6,353
R2 0.401 0.410 0.212 0.813 0.817 0.453
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes No No No
CEO FE No No No Yes No No
CFO FE No No No No Yes No
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Table 4
CEO versus CFO Effects
The table shows whether the relationship between the CFO index and cash holdings is affected
by firms with powerful CEOs and lower degree of delegation decisions. In Panel A, we split firms
into high and low CEO power groups based on the following three criteria: CEO Co-option, CEO
Relative Pay and CEO Pay Slice. In Panel B, we split firms into high degree and low degree
of delegation groups based on the following three criteria: Size (as measured by sales revenue),
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Activity and CEO Knowledge. The dependent variable is defined
as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total assets. The CFO Index
variable is constructed after combining six CFO attributes using principal component analysis as
discussed in Section 2.2. We show results using our baseline specification (Model 1 from Table 3).
All independent variables are lagged by one year (unreported for brevity). Analytical definitions
for all variables are provided in the Appendix. We run OLS regressions by adding year and
industry fixed effects in all regressions. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (reported
in parentheses). *** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Panel A: CEO Power
CEO Co-option CEO Relative Pay CEO Pay Slice
High Low High Low High Low
CEO Power CEO Power CEO Power CEO Power CEO Power CEO Power
CFO Index −0.004** −0.009*** −0.005*** −0.007*** −0.007*** −0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 4,910 2,348 3,288 3,304 3,681 3,684
R2 0.397 0.365 0.370 0.423 0.408 0.417
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsample comparison of coefficients on CFO Index
Chi Squared 1.91 0.40 0.34
p-values 0.162 0.526 0.558
Panel B: Degree of Delegation
Size M&A Activity CEO Knowledge
High Low High Low High Low
Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree Degree
CFO Index −0.003*** −0.005*** −0.003** −0.006*** −0.006*** −0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Observations 4,055 4,454 2,623 5,886 6,634 935
R2 0.257 0.385 0.325 0.413 0.410 0.355
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsample comparison of coefficients on: CFO Index
Chi Squared 1.22 1.17 0.03
p-values 0.268 0.278 0.864
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Table 5
Propensity Score Matching
This table presents the results from the propensity score matching analysis for treatment (strong
CFO) and control (weak CFO) firm-year observations. The treatment (strong CFO) group includes
those firms whose CFO index is in the top tercile of the CFO index across all firms in year t.
The control (weak CFO) group includes those firms whose CFO index is in the bottom tercile of
the CFO index across all firms in year t. Panel A presents the results from a covariate balance
test, which assesses whether the average values of covariates (firm-level determinants) are similar
across treatment (strong CFO) and control (weak CFO) firms. The t-statistic and the normalized
difference is for the difference in means between strong and weak CFO firms. The normalized
difference is calculated as the difference in means for treatment and match groups divided by the
square root of the average of the group variances. A normalized difference of 0.25 or less indicates
an acceptable balance (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). In Panel B, we compare the mean cash
holdings of strong CFO firms with control firms. The CFO index variable is constructed after
combining six CFO attributes using principal component analysis as discussed in Section 2.2.
Cash holding is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total
assets. The propensity score is estimated as a logit function of firm size, market-to-book ratio,
net working capital, capital expenditure, research and development, dividend, cash flow, cash flow
volatility and leverage. Analytical definitions for all variables are provided in the Appendix. We
match each strong CFO firm to a weak CFO firm using nearest neighbor without replacement
subject to caliper (i.e. maximum difference in propensity score) of 0.01 using psmatch2, a STATA
function written by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). We did exact matching on industry and year.
psmatch2 allows imposing common support condition by dropping treatment observations whose
p-score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum p-score of the controls. To test
the differences in means between the two samples (i.e. strong CFO firms and matched weak CFO
firms), we use bootstrapped standard errors (reported in brackets) based on 50 replications. ***
and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Covariate Balance Test
Strong CFO Firms Weak CFO Firms t-stats Normalized Diff.
Firm Size 11.581 11.491 1.131 0.029
Net Working Capital −0.009 −0.016 0.618 0.016
Capex 0.055 0.052 1.481 0.037
R&D 0.356 0.349 0.412 0.010
Dividend 0.608 0.594 0.767 0.019
Market-to-Book 1.774 1.855 −1.549 −0.039
Cash Flow −0.083 −0.098 0.658 0.017
Leverage 0.187 0.180 1.074 0.027
Cash Flow Volatility 0.195 0.214 −1.115 −0.028
Panel B: Propensity Score Matching
Obs. Strong CFO Firms Weak CFO Firms Difference z-test
(Treatment) (Control) (Bootstr. s.e.)
All CFOs 3,122 13.09% 14.45% -1.36%*** -2.97(0.004)
CFOs (Tenure >3 Years) 808 9.29% 11.26% -1.97%** -2.17(0.009)
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Table 6
Evidence From CFO Turnovers
Panel A presents mean differences in cash holdings between treatment firms (i.e. experiencing
a turnover from a weak to a strong CFO) and control firms (i.e. those that are always run by
weak CFOs). Panel B presents mean differences in cash holdings between treatment firms (i.e.
experiencing a turnover from a strong to a weak CFO) and control firms (i.e. those that are
always run by strong CFOs). Strong CFO firms are those firms whose CFO index is greater than
the median CFO index across all firms in year t. Weak CFO firms are those whose CFO index
is lower than the median CFO index across all firms in year t. The CFO Index is constructed
after combining six CFO attributes using principal component analysis as discussed in Section 2.2.
Cash holding is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total
assets. The propensity score is estimated as a logit function of firm size, market-to-book ratio,
net working capital, capital expenditure, research and development, dividend, cash flow, cash
flow volatility and leverage. Analytical definitions for all variables are provided in the Appendix.
We match each treatment group to a control group using nearest neighbor without replacement
subject to caliper (i.e. maximum difference in propensity score) of 0.05 using psmatch2, a STATA
function written by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). We did exact matching on industry and year.
psmatch2 allows imposing common support condition by dropping treatment observations whose
p-score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum p-score of the controls. *** and
** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Weak to Strong CFO Turnovers (Obs.=1146)
Mean Cash Holdings Difference Robust s.e.
Pre-Turnover Cash holdings
Treatment Firms (weak CFOs) 18.7%
Control Firms (weak CFOs) 16.9% 1.8% 0.021
Post-Turnover Cash holdings
Treatment Firms (strong CFOs) 12.2%
Control Firms (weak CFOs) 17.7% -5.5%*** 0.013
Diff.-in-Diff. (Post minus Pre-turnover) -7.3%*** 0.025
Panel B: Strong to Weak CFO Turnovers (Obs.= 550)
Mean Cash Holdings Difference Robust s.e.
Pre-Turnover Cash holdings
Treatment Firms (strong CFOs) 11.7%
Control Firms (strong CFOs) 13.1% -1.4% 0.020
Post-Turnover Cash holdings
Treatment Firms (weak CFOs) 16.3%
Control Firms (strong CFOs) 11.4% 4.9%*** 0.017
Diff.-in-Diff. (Post minus Pre-turnover) 6.3%** 0.027
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Table 7
IV Estimations
This table reports the results from an IV estimation on the relationship between cash holdings
and our CFO index. We use the number of financial experts (NOFE) as a potential instrument
for our CFO index. NOFE is defined as the number of financial expert directors (i.e. Chartered
Accountants, CFOs, and CEOs with past CFO experience) sitting on other firms’ boards where
the CFO also serves as a non-executive director. The results of the first stage regression are
presented in Model 1 and the results of the second stage regression are presented in Model 2. The
CFO Index variable is constructed after combining six CFO attributes using principal component
analysis as discussed in Section 2.2. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity (reported in
parentheses). Analytical definitions for all variables are provided in the Appendix. ***, ** and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Two-Stage IV Estimation
Model 1 Model 2
Predicted CFO Index - −0.006*
- (0.003)
NOFE 0.235*** -
(0.008) -
Two stage estimation First Stage Second Stage
No. of observations 8,127 8,127
Centered R2 0.186 0.318
Firm-level controls Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Kleinbergen-Paap rK Wald F -statistic (p-values) 718.09 (0.000) -
(Stock-Yogo critical values: 10%/15%) (16.38/8.96) -
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Table 8
The Effects of Financial Constraints
Panel A presents the results on the relationship between cash holdings and our CFO index
across financially constrained and unconstrained firms. We split firms into financially con-
strained and unconstrained groups based on the following three criteria: total debt, interest
coverage, KZ-index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). We use letter (C) for constrained firms and
(UC) for unconstrained firms. The dependent variable is defined as the ratio of cash and mar-
ketable securities to the book value of total assets. The CFO Index variable is constructed
after combining six CFO attributes using principal component analysis as discussed in Section
2.2. Panel B reports the normalized differences in the mean of the financial constraint proxies
between strong and weak CFO firms. The normalized difference is the difference in means for
strong and weak CFO group divided by the square root of the average of the group variances.
A normalized difference of 0.25 or less indicates an acceptable balance between the two groups
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). All independent variables are lagged by one year. Analytical
definitions for all variables are provided in the Appendix. We run OLS regressions by adding
year and industry fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Financial Constraint Proxies
Total Debt Interest Coverage KZ-Index
(C) (UC) (C) (UC) (C) (UC)
CFO Index 0.000 −0.008*** −0.002 −0.003** 0.000 −0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Firm Size 0.001 −0.013*** 0.000 −0.006*** 0.000 −0.014***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Net Working Capital −0.067*** −0.136*** −0.062*** −0.121*** −0.053*** −0.153***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Capital Expenditure 0.033* 0.245*** 0.293*** 0.008 0.173*** 0.355***
(0.020) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029) (0.026) (0.042)
R&D 0.015*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.011*** 0.030*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Dividend −0.021*** −0.013** −0.033*** −0.030*** −0.043*** −0.026***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Market-to-Book 0.001 0.002* 0.003** 0.015*** 0.002* 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Cash flow −0.032*** −0.056*** −0.066*** 0.043*** −0.074*** −0.059***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
Leverage −0.040*** −0.510*** −0.196*** −0.241*** −0.170*** −0.315***
(0.008) (0.027) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015)
Cash Flow Volatility 0.012*** 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.068*** 0.017*** 0.059***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Intercept 0.039** 0.299*** 0.132*** 0.160*** 0.112*** 0.264***
(0.019) (0.042) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.043)
Observations 4,282 4,227 3,469 3,507 3,721 3,726
R2 0.185 0.380 0.383 0.296 0.379 0.437
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Normalized Differences
Weak CFO Firms Strong CFO Firms Norm. diff
Total Debt 0.342 0.388 −0.046
Interest Coverage Ratio 4.99 7.260 −0.069
KZ-Index −17.659 −13.778 −0.064
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Table 10
CFOs and Access to Finance
This table shows whether strong CFOs are better able to raise new debt during the financial
crisis of 2008−2009. The dependent variable is debt issues, which is a dummy variable that equals
to 1 if the firm issues new debt in year t, and 0 otherwise. New debt issues are debt issued
minus debt retired. The CFO index variable is constructed after combining six CFO attributes
using principal component analysis as discussed in Section 2.2. Crisis 2008−2009 is a dummy
variable coded 1 for years 2008 and 2009 and 0 otherwise. The main variable of interest is the
interaction of the CFO Index with the Crisis 2008−2009 dummy. All independent variables are
lagged by one year. Analytical definitions for all variables are provided in the Appendix. We
run probit regressions by adding year and industry fixed effects in all specifications. Standard
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity (reported in parentheses). ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2
CFO Index 0.057*** −0.008
(0.009) (0.015)
Crisis 2008−2009 −0.900*** −0.366***
(0.178) (0.091)
CFO Index x Crisis 2008−2009 0.031* 0.067**
(0.019) (0.028)
Firm Size - 0.119***
- (0.016)
Net Working Capital - −0.294***
- (0.069)
Capital Expenditure - 1.107***
- (0.258)
R&D - −0.109**
- (0.043)
Dividend - 0.012
- (0.051)
Market-to-Book - −0.018
- (0.012)
Cash Flow - −0.060
- (0.076)
Cash Flow Volatility - −0.033
- (0.047)
Board Size - −0.009
- (0.011)
Board Independence - −0.058
- (0.152)
Executive Ownership - −0.001
- (0.002)
Non-executive Ownership - 0.001
- (0.002)
Institutional Ownership - −0.001
- (0.001)
CEO Age - 8.570
- (5.624)
CEO Age2 - −1.112
- (0.720)
CEO Tenure - 0.003
- (0.017)
CEO Sex - 0.378***
- (0.126)
Intercept 0.163 −18.460*
(0.180) (10.967)
Observations 9,615 5,865
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.061
Industry FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
50
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932832 
Table 11
The Value of Cash for Strong CFO Firms
Panel A presents the results on the value of cash holdings for strong CFO firms following the methodology
of Faulkender and Wang (2006). Panel B presents the marginal value of £1 for strong and weak CFO
firms. We split firms into financially constrained and unconstrained groups based on the following three
criteria: total debt, interest coverage and the KZ-index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Strong CFO Firm is
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CFO index is greater than the median CFO index across all firms in
year t, and 0 otherwise. The CFO index is constructed after combining six CFO attributes using principal
component analysis as discussed in Section 2.2. The (C) in the table refers to constrained firms and (UC)
refers to unconstrained firms. The dependent variable is Excess Return, which is defined as ri,t–R
B
i,t , where
ri,t is the stock return from year t-1 to t and R
B
i,t is the stock i’s benchmark return over the same period.
The benchmark portfolio is one of the 25 Fama−French portfolios based on size and book-to-market. All
independent variables except Strong CFO Firm and Leverage are scaled by the lagged market value of
equity (MVt−1 ). Cash is cash plus marketable securities. ∆Cashi,t represents change in cash holding from
year t-1 to t. We include the interaction variables to interact ∆Cashi,t with Strong CFO Firm as our main
variable of interest. Analytical definitions for all variables are provided in the Appendix. We run OLS
regressions by adding year and industry fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A
Full Sample Total Debt Interest Coverage Ratio KZ-Index
(C) (UC) (C) (UC) (C) (UC)
Strong CFO Firm 0.047*** 0.015 0.044 0.019 0.003 0.044* 0.049**
(0.016) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022)
Strong CFO Firm x ∆Cash −0.271*** 0.297** −0.388** 0.693*** −0.014 0.326** −0.240
(0.100) (0.144) (0.171) (0.182) (0.209) (0.164) (0.158)
∆Cash 1.134*** 0.633*** 1.145*** 0.740*** 0.793*** 0.854*** 0.963***
(0.097) (0.154) (0.170) (0.211) (0.225) (0.156) (0.168)
∆Earning 0.273*** 0.260*** 0.253*** 0.330*** 0.728*** 0.230*** 0.345***
(0.029) (0.035) (0.059) (0.053) (0.079) (0.040) (0.057)
∆Net Assets 0.146*** 0.170*** 0.159*** 0.192*** 0.175*** 0.210*** 0.142***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.042) (0.028) (0.046) (0.028) (0.033)
∆R&D 1.162*** 0.469 0.525 1.041 1.503 0.932 0.280
(0.442) (0.729) (0.662) (0.987) (0.962) (0.642) (0.624)
∆Interest Expense −1.521*** −0.496 1.287 −1.257** −4.272*** −1.433** 1.327
(0.456) (0.495) (1.735) (0.610) (1.385) (0.613) (0.906)
∆Dividend −0.397 −1.417*** 1.455 −0.701 1.424* −0.722 −0.434
(0.455) (0.520) (0.975) (0.572) (0.760) (0.654) (0.617)
Cash 0.321*** 0.346*** 0.314*** 0.397*** 0.294*** 0.437*** 0.233***
(0.041) (0.058) (0.069) (0.072) (0.075) (0.070) (0.056)
Leverage −0.287*** −0.486*** −1.005*** −0.182*** −0.295*** −0.260*** −0.437***
(0.042) (0.062) (0.166) (0.069) (0.105) (0.061) (0.074)
New Financing −0.097*** −0.232*** 0.034 −0.321*** −0.130 −0.292*** −0.150**
(0.033) (0.041) (0.069) (0.053) (0.090) (0.048) (0.058)
Cash x ∆Cash −0.174 −0.265 0.141 −0.551** −0.704** −0.230 0.075
(0.124) (0.181) (0.221) (0.234) (0.354) (0.212) (0.223)
Leverage x ∆Cash −1.104*** −0.493* −1.136 −1.394*** −0.248 −0.911*** −0.876**
(0.190) (0.262) (0.751) (0.345) (0.805) (0.311) (0.394)
Intercept 0.247** 0.233* 0.192 0.120 0.266* 0.015 0.411***
(0.104) (0.125) (0.176) (0.083) (0.139) (0.093) (0.150)
Observations 8,108 3,220 3,228 2,061 2,063 2,948 2,957
R2 0.088 0.104 0.109 0.121 0.125 0.102 0.099
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: The Value of £1
Strong CFO Firms £0.62 £0.79 £0.56 £1.08 £0.62 £0.97 £0.56
Weak CFO Firms £0.89 £0.50 £0.94 £0.39 £0.64 £0.64 £0.80
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Internet Appendix:
How Do Chief Financial Officers Influence Corporate
Cash Policies?
Chris Florackis† and Sushil Sainani
Abstract
In this Internet Appendix, we offer supplementary results for our paper “How Do Chief
Financial Officers Influence Corporate Cash Policies”. More specifically, we check the ro-
bustness of our findings using a GMM estimator as well as alternative cash specifications,
alternative measures of cash holdings and three modified versions of our CFO index. To fully
understand and further analyze how CFOs affect firm outcomes, we (i) provide additional
evidence on how individual CFO attributes affect cash holdings and (ii) examine the CFO
effect on other financial and investment corporate policies.
†Corresponding Author, Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Liverpool Management School,
UK. Email addresses: c.florackis@liv.ac.uk (Chris Florackis), s.sainani@liv.ac.uk (Sushil Sainani).
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A.1 Alternative Measures of Cash Holdings
In this section, we employ alternative measures of cash holdings to ensure that our main
results are not driven by the choice of the cash holdings variable. The results are presented in
Table A.1. In Panel A, the dependent variable is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable
securities to sales, as in Harford (1999). In Panel B, we use the industry-adjusted measure
of cash to sales ratio (cash holdings), as in Harford et al. (2012). The results in Panels A
and B of Table A.1 are qualitatively similar to our main findings (see Table 3 of our paper).
A.2 Alternative Cash Estimation Models
Our baseline cash specification (see Model 1 of Table 3 of our paper) is based on Opler et al.
(1999), who developed one of the most widely used cash models in the literature. In this
section, we check the robustness of our main finding to using alternative cash models that
include the firm-level controls proposed by Bates et al. (2009) and Oler and Picconi (2014).
Bates et al. (2009) adds an acquisition variable to the Opler’s et al. (1999) model to control
for the fact that firms tend to reduce their cash balance in acquisitions. Oler and Picconi
(2014) also make several modifications to Opler’s et al. (1999) cash model, such as replacing
cash flow with cash flow from operations, adding firm age, tax burden on foreign income and
sales growth and removing leverage and market-to-book. Analytical definitions for these
variables are provided in the Appendix.
Table A.2 presents the results. In Models 1 and 2, we extend the benchmark models
proposed by Bates et al. (2009) and Oler and Picconi (2014), respectively, by adding our CFO
index as an additional explanatory variable. The results in Models 1 and 2 remain consistent
with our main finding in our paper. The coefficient on the CFO index is consistently negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level in both models. The results on the control
variables suggested by Bates et al. (2009) and Oler and Picconi (2014) are in line with their
findings. Last, in Model 3 of Table A.2, we present evidence that our results remain robust
to the use of a Tobit regression that controls for the zero censored observations in cash
holdings. Overall, our primary findings are robust to alternative specifications suggested by
other prior studies on cash holdings.
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A.3 CFOs and Cash holdings: Index Components
In this section, we re-estimate our baseline specification (Model 1 of Table 3) after replacing
our CFO index with each of the six CFO index components namely, CFO executive director
(Model 1), CFO outside director (Model 2), CFO seniority (Model 3), CFO financial expertise
(Model 4), CFO top 3 (Model 5) and CFO relative pay (Model 6). Analytical definitions of
all these variables are provided in the Appendix.
The results, as presented in Table A.3, show that all of the six components are negatively
and significantly associated with cash holdings. The economic magnitudes of these findings
are also relevant. For instance, CFO board membership (outside board membership) is
associated with 2.3 (0.7) percentage-point decrease in the cash holdings.
In Model 7 of Table A.3, we add all of them in the model and find that the standard
errors increase substantially and hence t-ratios decline in all cases. This is likely to be driven
by the multicollinearity problem. Indeed, we have estimated the variable inflation factor in
Model 7 and it seems to be very high (VIF = 17.35). These results further justify the use
of a composite index, rather than individual components, for measuring the CFO ability to
influence firm outcomes.
A.4 Evidence from GMM Estimations
In this section, we estimate the following dynamic cash model:
Cash holdingsi ,t = β1 Cash holdingsi ,t−1 + β2 CFO Indexi ,t−1 + ΣγkFirm Controls i ,t
+αi + αt + νi ,t (1)
Using a GMM estimator and in particular Arellano and Bond’s (1991) two-step approach.
The first step efficiently eliminates any unobservable individual effects (αi) through first
differencing. The second step estimates the first-differenced equation using GMM, which
enables the use of lagged values of cash holdings, CFO index and other endogenous firm
controls as possible instruments. The lags used in our GMM specification are reported in
the notes of Table A.4.
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Model 1 of Table A.4 presents the results from the difference GMM estimation. The
dependent variable is cash holdings. We employ the same set of firm controls that we used
in our baseline Model 1 of Table 3 in the main body of the paper. The results indicate
that the coefficient on the CFO index continues to be negative and statistically significant
at the 5% level. To test the consistency of these estimates, we perform Hansen’s (1982) J
test of over-identifying restrictions under the null that instruments are valid. The validity of
instruments also depends on the absence of high second order serial correlation in the error
term. Therefore, we also report the m2 statistic developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
to test for the existence of second order serial correlation in first difference residuals.1 The
Hansen J -statistic yields a p-value of 0.167, which means that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that our instruments are valid. The results in Model 1 of Table A.4 also reveal a
m2 statistic with a p-value of 0.301, which suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no second order serial correlation.
We also employ the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998), which includes equations in both levels and differences in
the estimation procedure. The system GMM estimator helps control for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and the dynamic relationship between current values
of explanatory variables and past values of cash holdings (see e.g., Wintoki et al., 2012).
Model 2 of Table A.4 presents the results from the two-step system GMM estimation. We find
that the coefficient of the CFO index retains its negative sign and is statistically significant
at the 10% level. The Hansen (1982) J -test supports the validity of the additional moments
conditions utilized in the two-step system GMM and the m2 statistic test further confirms
the absence of second order serial correlation in the error term.
A.5 Alternative Measures of the CFO Index
In this section, we assess the robustness of our results after replacing our benchmark CFO
index with three modified CFO indexes. In the first modified CFO index (Models 1 and 2,
in Panel B of Table A.5), we replace CFO Relative Pay with a variable of CFO relative pay
1First differencing Equation (1), makes first difference residuals denoted as ∆νi,t mathematically correlated to
∆νi,t−1 through a shared term νi,t−1 , thus, in transformed model negative first order serial correlation is expected.
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that includes equity-based compensation. We also replace CFO Seniority with CFO Tenure,
which is defined as the number of years that the CFO has been with the firm, respectively.
Zajac and Westphal (1996) argue that an executive’s (the CFO, in our case) influence on
firm decisions also increases with his/er experience and knowledge about the firm’s resources,
operations and risks.
In the second modified CFO index (Models 3 and 4, in Panel B of Table A.5), we extend
our benchmark CFO index by including CFO Co-option, a dummy variable that indicates
whether the CFO was appointed into the current position before the current CEO took office
or not. We use CFO co-option as an additional attribute to measure CFOs’ independence
from the CEO in decision-making. We draw upon the idea of CEO co-option from Coles
et al. (2014). Following Landier et al. (2013), we argue that CFOs who joined the firm
before the current CEO was appointed are more likely to be “independent from the CEO”
in exercising their own preferences.
In the third modified CFO index (Models 5 and 6, Panel B of Table A.5), we use two
alternative measures that could also reflect the CFO’s relative importance or power within
the top management team. We replace CFO Seniority with CFO Relative Tenure, defined
as the ratio of the CFO’s tenure to the CEO’s tenure (see Westphal and Zajac, 1995). We
also replace CFO Top 3 with CFO Pay Slice, which is defined as the ratio of the CFO’s
total annual compensation to the aggregate of total top five executives’ compensation (see
Bebchuk et al., 2011). Detailed definitions of all variables used for the construction of our
modified CFO indexes are provided in the Appendix.
Our results of the principal component analysis, as presented in Panel A of Table A.5
strongly suggest that none of these alternative CFO-specific variables add significantly to
the information contained in the benchmark version of the index. To the contrary, the
proportions explained by the modified CFO indexes are actually lower. Nevertheless, the
results, as presented in Panel B, verify a negative association between each of the modified
CFO indexes and cash holdings.
Internet Appendix - Page 5 of 13
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932832 
A.6 The Effect of CFOs on Other Corporate Policies
This section provides evidence on the relation between CFO index and leverage, defined as
the ratio of long term debt plus short term debt to total assets (Model 1), debt maturity,
defined as the ratio of long term debt to total debt (Model 2); dividend policy, which is a
dummy variable that indicates whether a firm pays dividend in current year or not (Model
3); capital expenditure, defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to net assets (Model 4);
R&D investment, which is a dummy variable that indicates whether a firm invest in R&D
in a given year or not (Model 5) and M&A activity, which is a dummy variable whether a
firm completes at least one acquisition in a given year or not (Model 6). Models 1, 2 and 4
are estimated using ordinary least squares regressions with standard errors clustered at the
firm level, whereas Models 3, 5 and 6 are estimated using logit regressions.
These results, as presented in Table A.6, show that firms with strong CFOs (i.e., high
values of the CFO index) are more likely to distribute (pay) dividends. Regarding invest-
ment policies, we find that firms with strong CFOs are more likely to invest in research
and development and in acquiring other firms. However, we do not find any evidence that
would suggest firms with strong CFOs are committed more heavily on debt, or in particular,
towards long term debt. This perhaps is explained by the fact that, in addition to their
ability/influence, several CFO behavioural traits and risk-taking incentives seem to matter
in explaining capital structure decisions (see e.g., Malmendier et al., 2016 and Chava and
Purnanandam, 2010). Finally, our findings that strong CFOs hold less cash, invest more in
R&D, are more likely to pay dividends and engage into M&A deals is consistent with our
reasoning about a weaker precautionary motive that strong CFOs may have.
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Table A.1
Alternative Measures of Cash Holdings
This table presents additional results on the relationship between cash holdings and our CFO Index
using two alternative measures of cash holdings. In Panel A, the dependent variable is defined as the
ratio of cash and marketable securities to sales, as in Harford (1999). In Panel B, industry-adjusted
measure of cash to sales ratio (cash holdings), as in Harford et al. (2012). The industry-adjusted
measure is calculated as cash to sales ratio (cash holdings) minus the median industry level of the
cash to sales ratio. In Models 1 and 2 of Panels A-B, we use an ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression with standard errors clustered at the firm level. In Models 3, 4 and 5 of Panels A-B, we
add firm, CEO and CFO fixed effects, respectively. In Model 6, we use a Fama-MacBeth (1973)
regression approach. In our baseline Model 1 of Panels A-B, we extend the Opler’s et al. (1999) cash
model by adding our CFO Index as an additional explanatory variable. In Models 2-6 of Panels A-B,
we add board-, ownership- and CEO-specific characteristics. The CFO Index variable is constructed
after combining six CFO attributes using principal component analysis as discussed in Section 2.2 of
our paper. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Analytical definitions for all variables
are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Cash to Sales Ratio (Cash Holdings)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
CFO Index −0.017*** −0.017*** −0.019*** −0.020*** −0.011** −0.018***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 8,116 6,165 6,165 6,165 6,165 6,165
R2 0.365 0.374 0.098 0.825 0.846 0.419
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes No No No
CEO FE No No No Yes No No
CFO FE No No No No Yes No
Panel B: Industry-adjusted Cash to Sales Ratio (Cash Holdings)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
CFO Index −0.017*** −0.017*** −0.020*** −0.021*** −0.011** −0.018***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 8,116 6,165 6,165 6,165 6,165 6,165
R2 0.310 0.322 0.102 0.809 0.831 0.374
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No Yes No No No
CEO FE No No No Yes No No
CFO FE No No No No Yes No
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Table A.2
Alternative Cash Estimation Models
This table presents additional results on the relationship between cash holdings and our CFO index.
The dependent variable is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value
of total assets. The CFO index variable is constructed after combining six CFO attributes using
principal component analysis as discussed in Section 2.2 of our paper. In Model 1, we extend the
cash model of Bates et al. (2009) by adding CFO index as an additional explanatory variable. In
Model 2, we extend the cash model of Oler and Picconi (2014) by adding CFO index as an additional
explanatory variable. We run OLS regressions in Models 1 and 2. In Model 3, we re-estimate Model
2 using a Tobit regression, as in Oler and Piconni (2014). All independent variables are lagged by
one year. Analytical definitions for all variables are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Industry and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
CFO Index −0.005*** −0.003*** −0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Size −0.006*** −0.013*** −0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Net Working Capital −0.103*** −0.042*** −0.042***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Capital Expenditure 0.173*** 0.249*** 0.257***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025)
R&D 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.036***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Dividend −0.017*** 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cash Flow Volatility 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.039***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Market-to-Book 0.005*** - -
(0.001) - -
Cash Flow −0.058*** - -
(0.003) - -
Leverage −0.290*** - -
(0.008) - -
Acquisition −0.018*** - -
(0.003) - -
Cash From Operations - −0.080*** −0.080***
- (0.004) (0.004)
Sales Growth - −0.003 −0.002
- (0.002) (0.002)
Firm Age - −0.017*** −0.017***
- (0.003) (0.003)
Tax Burden on Foreign - 0.015*** 0.016***
- (0.005) (0.005)
Intercept 0.204*** 0.177** 0.170**
(0.024) (0.070) (0.071)
Observations 8,368 8,204 8,204
R2 0.402 0.299 -
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table A.3
CFOs and Cash Holdings: Index Components
This table presents the results from several regressions on the relationship between cash holdings
and the six attributes of our CFO Index. The dependent variable is defined as the ratio of cash and
marketable securities to the book value of total assets. All independent variables are lagged by one
year. Analytical definitions for all CFO attributes are provided in the Appendix. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
CFO Executive Director −0.023*** - - - - - 0.011
(0.005) - - - - - (0.013)
CFO Outside Director - −0.007* - - - - −0.003
- (0.003) - - - - (0.004)
CFO Seniority - - –0.000*** - - - –0.000*
- - (0.000) - - - (0.000)
CFO Financial Expertise - - - −0.016*** - - −0.008
- - - (0.004) - - (0.005)
CFO Top 3 - - - - −0.013*** - −0.003
- - - - (0.003) - (0.005)
CFO Relative Pay - - - - - −0.009*** −0.004
- - - - - (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 8,509 8,509 8,509 8,509 8,509 8,509 8,509
R2 0.401 0.399 0.401 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.401
Firm-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A.4
GMM Estimations
This table presents the results from the dynamic panel GMM estimation. In Model 1, we report
the results of the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference-GMM estimator, whereas in Model 2, we
report the results from Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) system-GMM
estimator. The dependent variable is defined as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the
book value of total assets. For the difference equations, we employ three lags (in levels) for the
lagged dependent variable and four lags for CFO index and other firm controls as instruments. For
system equations, we employ three lags (in first difference) for the lagged dependent variable and
four lags for CFO index and other firm controls as an additional instruments for system-GMM
estimations. The Hansen test of over-identification is under the null hypothesis that all instruments
are valid. m2 is the test statistic for the second order (AR2) serial correlation in the first-differenced
residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. We use the STATA command xtabond2
created by Roodman (2009) to produce GMM estimates based on a two-step GMM estimator that
produces standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity (reported in parentheses). We use
the Windmeijer’s standard error correction method (Windmeijer, 2005). Analytical definitions for
all variables are provided in the Appendix. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively.
GMM Estimation
Model 1 Model 2
Cash Holdingst−1 0.307*** 0.368***
(0.028) (0.027)
CFO Index −0.005** −0.003*
(0.002) (0.001)
Estimation method Difference GMM System GMM
No. of observations 6,798 8,488
Hansen J -statistic for over-identification (p-value) 437.62 (0.167) 378.61 (0.217)
m2 z-statistic (p-value) 1.04 (0.301) 1.51 (0.130)
Year FE Yes Yes
Firm-level controls Yes Yes
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